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detention laws and the legislature complied with increasing
frustration. Our argument is that although the Court courageously
protected the undocumented entrants’ rights, it also resorted to
strategic ambiguity as a means of institutional survival in light of
legislative threats to incorporate a general legislative override clause
and executive attempts to “pack” the Court with conservative
justices through appointments. This high-stakes dialogue is
unprecedented in the Israeli context and uncommon in comparative
law. We argue that courts must not only protect the constitutional
and international human rights of undocumented entrants, but also
bring the political branches to accountability. They should force
states to conduct refugee status determinations in a timely manner
rather than be satisfied with temporary protection regimes. They
should further recognize that rights may accumulate as a result of a
prolonged presence of an undocumented entrant in a country. The
Article discusses the Israeli judicial techniques used to reduce the
conflict with the representative branches, including the use of
constitutional avoidance and comparative law, and juxtaposes them
with the American approach evident in Zadvydas v. Davis and
Jennings v. Rodriguez. The harsh implications of a policy that leaves
people in an indeterminate state of mere protection from removal
are manifest in the Israeli story and should serve as a warning to the
U.S. courts as they formulate their reaction to the recent asylum ban.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The treatment of immigrants in general and asylum seekers in
particular is hotly contested around the world and is the subject of
parliamentary and presidential election campaigns.1 The Western
world is awakening to a new age of protectionism, exclusion and
border control in light of the rising and massive waves of migration
of immigrants and asylum seekers worldwide.2 As states fight
against immigration, they turn to each other for “inspiration” on the
most effective means of exclusion. Similarly, domestic courts often
adopt each other’s standards of interpretation when they delineate
states’ obligations under international immigration law. Therefore,
a comparative approach to immigration law is beneficial to the
understanding of how both representative branches and courts
operate.
Israel, too, is currently coping with a population of
undocumented entrants. Within a few years (primarily 2006–2013),
about 65,000 undocumented entrants arrived in Israel—a country
roughly the size of the state of New Jersey3—with a population of
8,796,200 residents4 and a territory of 8,630 sq. miles,5 through the
State’s southern border with Egypt. Israel is surrounded by a
number of countries with which it maintains tense to conflictual
relations, through which the migrants have crossed. While the
nationality of undocumented entrants varied, approximately 70%
are from Eritrea and about 20% from Sudan.6 Hundreds of
1 See, e.g., Lewis Davis & Sumit S. Deole, Immigration and the Rise of Far-Right
Parties in Europe, 15 IFO DICE REPORT–J. FOR INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS 10, 10
(2017); Martin Halla, Alexander F. Wagner, & Joseph Zweimüller, Immigration and
Voting for the Far Right, 15 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1341 (2017) (discussing the increase
in support of right wing parties following an inflow of immigrants into a
neighborhood).
2 See STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION:
INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD (4th ed. 2009).
3
See
Quick
Facts:
New
Jersey,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/NJ/PST045218#
[https://perma.cc/9M92-CSYT] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
4
Demographic Characteristics, ISR. CENT. BUREAU STAT. (Apr. 27, 2017),
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_SHTML&ID=403
[https://perma.cc/6EWB-KNDT].
5
See Israel—Size and Dimension, ISR. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (2013),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Israel-Size-andDimension.aspx [https://perma.cc/55QM-UYKQ].
6
See Data on Foreigners in Israel, POPULATION & IMMIGR. AUTHORITY 7 (Jan.
2018),
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thousands of the nationals of these two African dictatorships have
fled and sought refuge in different countries around the world.7
This Article examines Israel’s policy towards people who
entered the State in an undocumented manner, through a nonrecognized border crossing point. It argues that Israel refrained for
many years from deciding whether these individuals are entitled to
refugee protection, and that the Court enabled the State to get away
with it. Indeed, there is no agreement on the reason for the entry of
these persons into Israel. The undocumented entrants argue that
they are refugees, and the State cannot return them to their home
countries for fear of persecution on political, ethnic or religious
grounds.8 On the other hand, the State argues that these people by
and large are seeking to improve their economic conditions, and
does not interpret the definition of “refugee” in international law to

https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/foreign_workers_stats/he/foreign
ers_in_Israel_data_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MMU-XRSY] (in Hebrew)
[hereinafter 2018 Data of PIA].
7
See File: First Instance Decisions by Outcome and Recognition Rates, 30 Main
Citizenships of Asylum Applicants Granted Decisions in the EU-28, 4th Quarter 2016,
EUROSTAT:
STAT.
EXPLAINED
(Mar.
16,
2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=File:First_instance_decisions_by_outcome_and_recogn
recog_rates,_30_main_citizenships_of_asylum_applicants_granted_decisions_in_t
ht_EU-28,_4th_quarter_2016.png [https://perma.cc/XMS6-BPPA].
8
Eritreans primarily argue that they fled army service, or the mandatory draft
of 18 months that might lead to indefinite army service, in conditions amounting to
slavery. If Israel returns them to Eritrea after fleeing army service, they argue that
they might be subject to torture or even death. See, e.g., File No. 1010-14 Appeals
Tribunal (Jerusalem), John Doe v. Ministry of Interior (Feb. 15, 2018), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) [hereinafter Mesegene Case]. They
further argue that they could not have enjoyed refugee protection in Egypt, even
though they passed through it on their way to Israel, since it was not a safe country
for them. Egypt has executed a few asylum seekers, tortured and detained others
and returned people to Eritrea where they suffered further persecution. Israel was
the first safe country in which they arrived and could seek refuge. Sudanese
primarily argue that they fled the genocide in Darfur or civil war. See, e.g., Sinai
Perils: Risks to Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers in Egypt and Israel, HUM. RTS.
WATCH
(Nov.
2008),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt1108webwcover.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NKS-ZWAE]. Both groups demand that the State, which is a
party to the 1951 International Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
the additional protocol (Refugee Convention), respect its international obligations
to refugees. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. They
should thus receive protection and access to rights in Israel.
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include them.9 As a result, only a few are recognized as refugees,
and the rest—those who never applied for asylum, those whose
asylum applications were never determined, and those whose
asylum applications were denied—had received a temporary
group-based protection from refoulement to their states of origin.10
We will therefore refer to these individuals as “undocumented
entrants”, people who entered in an undocumented way but their
presence in the country is documented, intentionally refraining from
using the derogatory language of illegality or the legitimizing
language of refugees. We do so despite our inclination to believe
that many of these individuals are refugees. We use this term for

9
With regard to Eritreans, Israel argues that fleeing army service is not a cause
for refugee status in and of itself, unless the person can further show that he will be
individually persecuted on political grounds. See Uri Tal, Infiltrators and Asylum
Seekers from Sudan in Israel—Submitted to the Interior and Environmental Protection
Committee of the Knesset, THE KNESSET’S CENTER FOR RESEARCH & INFORMATION (June
19, 2007). With regard to Sudanese, the State claims that as Sudan is an enemy state,
it is not obliged to grant its nationals asylum. It further claims that Israel was not
the first safe country that the Sudanese passed by after fleeing their home country.
Egypt, for example, which almost all Sudanese had crossed through, was willing to
grant some refugee status. On the dispute between the parties, see File No. 8665/14
High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset para. 4 (Aug. 11, 2015)
(Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
10 See, e.g., File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset (Aug. 11, 2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
Currently, Eritreans enjoy an unofficial temporary group protection—recognized
in judicial decisions, though not anchored in official government decisions or
legislation, while Sudanese are not returned primarily because of lack of diplomatic
relations between the two countries, in addition to the recognition of the hardship
they would likely experience, if returned. See State Comptroller’s Annual Report
68c, Chapter 2: On Minister of Interior—The Population and Immigration
Authority: The Treatment of Political Asylum Seekers in Israel, 1428, n. 19 (May
2018) (in Hebrew) [hereinafter State Comptroller 2018 Report],
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_627/8eaa80a0-a426-4424-aefa8fdc4e8b176a/221-zarim-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GZX-XZQD]. PIA issued only
short-term documents, which grant them a fragile status with very few rights, and
force them to constantly renew their papers in lengthy bureaucratic processes. The
State granted them temporary stay status lasting between two to four months.
Lately, in October 2019, the Minister of Interior decided to lengthen the period to
last between half a year to a year each time. See Orly Harrari, Improvements to
Infiltrators from Eritrea and Sudan, ISR. NAT’L NEWS (Mar. 3, 2018),
https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/367608
[https://perma.cc/NPJ49RRQ]. The State denied them any option of naturalization; Yuval Livnat, Refugees
and Permanent Status in Asylum State, in WHERE LEVINSKI MEETS ASMARA: ASYLUM
SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN ISRAEL – SOCIAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 343 (Tally KritzmanAmir ed., 2015) (in Hebrew); see also infra note 40.
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the sake of caution, since most of them did not undergo Refugee
Status Determination (RSD) on their individual cases.11
Israel’s struggles with undocumented entry and its immigration
and asylum policy regime are closely studied by the Trump
administration. Thus, for example, the erection of a Southern border
fence along Israel’s border with Egypt, which effectively blocked
almost all undocumented entry into the country, is offered as proof
to the feasibility of this plan on the U.S.’ Mexican border.12 The
American travel ban has an antecedent counter-part in Israel’s
policy, banning entry of nationals of certain enemy countries,
including a ban on the entrance of young Palestinians from the West
11
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR’s
Position on the Status of Eritrean and Sudanese Nationals Defined as ‘Infiltrators’
by
Israel
(Nov.
2017)
[hereinafter
2017
UNHCR
position],
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5a5889584.html
[https://perma.cc/7D2RGX39]. According to Daniel Solomon, the Legal Adviser of the Population and
Immigration Authority (PIA), in the discussions of the Interior and Protection of
Environment Committee of the Israeli legislature (Knesset) in November 2017:
“Eritreans submitted 9,189 applications for asylum since 2007. Israel decided 5,050
cases and 4,139 cases are still pending. Ten Eritreans received refugee status.
Sudanese submitted 3,170 applications. Israel decided 1,494 cases and 1,676 cases
are still pending. Only one Sudanese person received a refugee status.” Protocol
no. 508 of Interior and Environment Protection Committee, 28 (Nov. 27, 2017),
http://m.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawBill.aspx?t=laws
uggestionssearch&lawitemid=2023509; see also Press Release of the Interior
Committee
on
Infiltrators
Law
(Nov.
19,
2017),
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/InternalAffairs/News/Pages/2
91117.aspx# [https://perma.cc/FJ6Z-3RDD]. Cf. 2018 Data of PIA, supra note 6, at
1 (noting that between 2013 and 2017, 9,539 Eritreans and 4,559 Sudanese applied
for asylum in Israel).
See 2017 UNHCR position, 1 (Nov. 2017),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5a5889584.html
[https://perma.cc/7D2RGX39] (noting that the asylum applications submitted, 3,567 Eritreans and 3,870
Sudanese, had pending applications in June 2017). It is not clear why there are
discrepancies in the data. This data means that Israel recognized less than 0.1% of
those applying for asylum from Sudan and Eritrea as refugees. Many did not
submit official applications for asylum out of lack of confidence in the process. Id.
at 1–2. Israel also granted 500 Sudanese from Darfur temporary residence status
based on humanitarian grounds. This status grants fewer rights than a refugee
status since these people are not entitled to bring their immediate family members
to Israel. See State Comptroller 2018 Report, supra note 10, at 1448–49. According
to the Comptroller, between 2009 and 2017, the Minister of Interior granted refugee
status to 52 out of 55,433 seekers of asylum in Israel. Eight of these recognized
refugees are from Eritrea and one from Darfur. Id. at 1436, 1447.
12
Except for a few dozens of people who entered Israel in 2015 despite the
barrier, there were no entries through the Egyptian border since 2013. A MAJORITY
STAFF REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE, 115TH CONG., SECURING ISRAEL: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM A NATION UNDER CONSTANT THREAT OF ATTACK (Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter
SECURING ISRAEL].
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Bank into Israel, even for family unification purposes, and an
exclusion of enemy nations from the asylum system.13
Additionally, we show that not only has Israel influenced U.S.
immigration policy, but the Israeli Supreme Court has explicitly
relied upon U.S. law, and primarily the Zadvydas v. Davis decision,
to develop Israeli immigration detention law, albeit in a problematic
way.14 While the confrontation between the courts and the
representative branches over the treatment of undocumented
entrants heated in the U.S. primarily since Trump’s election, 15 the
Israeli drama has been unfolding since 2007. The successes and
failures of the Israeli judicial policy and strategies in protecting
rights of undocumented entrants should thus be studied carefully
by anyone interested in understanding the stakes involved.
The Israeli debate regarding the treatment of these
undocumented entrants is conducted along deeply emotional lines
as well. According to its Declaration of Independence, Israel was
founded after the Second World War, as the nation state for the
Jewish people, many of whom survived the Holocaust, leading
many of its people to know a thing or two about persecution and
seeking asylum. For a lot of them, their personal or family histories
include seeking refuge. Many are well-familiar with the harsh
consequences and the inevitable losses of a merciless world turning
a blind eye to human misery.16 In fact, this awareness of the
importance of the surrogate protection to refugees, was precisely the
reason for Israel’s active involvement in the drafting process of the
Refugee Convention.17 Yet, many in the Israeli society raise
(justified or unjustified) concerns about the impact of this
undocumented migration, mostly along the lines of demography,

13 See, e.g., HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior, 61 P.D. 202 (2006) (Isr.);
HCJ 466/07 MK Zahava Galon v. Attorney General, 65(2) PD 44 (2012) (Isr.); Tally
Kritzman-Amir & Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Nationality Bans, U. ILL. L. REV. 563 (2019).
14
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
15
Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks
‘Obama
Judge’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
21,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-chief-justice-robertsrebuke.html [https://perma.cc/U3GQ-Y3PX].
16
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 OFFICIAL
GAZETTE
1
(May
14,
1948),
https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm.
17
File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset,
para. 13 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Melcer, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription,
in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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economy, sovereignty, and security.18 In particular, there is concern
over the fact that these persons reside primarily in under-developed
neighborhoods. While some welcome the migrants to those
neighborhoods, others from the native residents vocally object to
having to share their already-lacking infrastructure and social
services with the migrants, as the responsibility to the integration of
these undocumented entrants is unevenly shared by the Israeli
population.19
Due to these concerns, and for potentially many other reasons,
Israel adopted numerous exclusionary practices with regard to
undocumented entrants. Israel has erected a fence along the
Egyptian border,20 which blocked virtually all undocumented
entries since 2013.21 It placed the undocumented entrants in
immigration detention, enacting provisions to allow prolonged
detention periods22 and other forms of limitations on the freedom of
movement such as a forced residence of some of the men in a
designated center23 and geographical restrictions on movement and
employment.24 Israel signed agreements with third-party countries
to remove these undocumented entrants to their territories.25 The
State imposed economic restrictions on undocumented entrants,
18
See, e.g., Elizabeth Tsurkov, Workers Hotline: “Cancer in Our Body”—On
Racial Incitement against Asylum Seekers from Africa, Discrimination and Hate Crimes
against
them
(Jan.–June
2012),
https://hotline.org.il/wpcontent/uploads/IncitementAndHateCrimesReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MQX-KH9Q].
19
File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset,
para. 20 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
20
SECURING ISRAEL, supra note 12.
21
Not a single person was able to come in through the Egyptian border in
2017, and only a handful came in since 2013. 2018 Data of PIA, supra note 6, at 3.
22
Prevention of Infiltration (Offenses and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714–1954, 8 133,
(1953–54) (Isr.). The Israeli legislature amended the harsh provisions as a result of
judicial review, as elaborated in this Article.
23
Id. These provisions are no longer valid.
24
In February 2008, the Minister of Interior decided to prohibit this
population from working or staying in the geographical areas between Gadera and
Hadera, covering the center of Israel. This policy was inserted as a condition of the
temporary permits of stay issued to these people, under § 2 of the Entry into Israel
Law. See Entry into Israel Law, 5712–1952, § 2, 6 159, (1951–52) (Isr.). A petition
against this policy to the Supreme Court led the Minister of Interior to cancel this
policy. See File No. 5616/09 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), African Refugee
Development Center v. Minister of Interior (Aug. 26, 2009), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
25
File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals, Zegete v. Minister of the Interior
(Aug. 28, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

52

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:1

which included heavy taxation on their employers,26 salary
reductions,27 and limitations on their ability to transfer remittances
until they departed from Israel.28 It also limited their ability to access
the Israeli welfare state by excluding them from the national health
care scheme,29 denying their access to most social and economic
rights (including the right to gainful employment,30 housing
subsidies, most governmental and municipal welfare services, legal

26
File No. 4946/16 Court of Appeals, Saad v. Revenue Services, Ashkelon
Branch (Sept. 12, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.)
(stating that employers who employ foreign workers in Israel, including people
from Sudan and Eritrea, have to pay a special tax of 20% of the salary of the
employee to the State. This tax cannot be deducted from the employee’s salary, but
it makes employing foreign workers less attractive and their salaries more costly to
employers. The Supreme Court denied a petition against the application of this tax
to undocumented migrants.).
27
Under the amendment to the Foreign Workers Law, 5751–1991, which
became effective on May 1, 2017, the State requires employers of people who
entered Israel through a non-authorized border crossing to make monthly deposits
to a designated account held by the State in favor of the employee. The State will
release these monies only when the person permanently leaves Israel and may
forfeit the money if he does not leave Israel when required. The employer will
deposit 16% of the employee’s wages as severance and pension funds. In addition,
the employer will deduct 20% of the employee’s wages in favor of this deposit. See
Yoel Lipovetzky, Information Sheet—Infiltrator Foreign Worker Deposit, POPULATION
AND
IMMIGRATION
AUTHORITY
(May
14,
2017),
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/guide/guide_for_infilitrators_regarding_monie
s_from_employers/he/Information%20Sheet%20%E2%80%93%20Infiltrator%20F
oreign%20Worker%20Deposit.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D5N-TL8Q]. In practice, in
most cases, employers pocketed the deductions instead of putting them in the
deposit. This practice was met by little enforcement. See Lee Yaron, Israeli
Employers Pocketing Deposits Deducted From Asylum Seekers’ Pay, HAARETZ (June 28,
2019, 1:42 AM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeliemployers-pocketing-deposits-deducted-from-asylum-seekers-pay-1.7418455
[https://perma.cc/8TN6-UBRA]; see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Under
Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, Trafficking in
Persons Report 254 (June 20, 2019) (calling on Israel to “[r]epeal the ‘Deposit Law’
(article 4 of the Prevention of Infiltration Law), which significantly increases
vulnerabilities to trafficking for the irregular African migrant population.”).
28
Prevention of Infiltration (Offenses and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714–1954, §§ 7a,
7b, 7c, 8 133, (1953–54) (as amended in 2018) (Isr.).
29
According to the Foreign Workers Order (Prohibition of Unlawful
Employment and Assurance of Fair Conditions) (Health Services Package to
Workers), 2001, the law requires employers to pay for private health insurance that
covers specified services, regardless of the legal status of the foreign employee. See
Health
Insurance
for
Foreign
Workers,
KOL
ZCHUT,
https://www.kolzchut.org.il/en/Health_Insurance_for_Foreign_Workers
[https://perma.cc/G5EG-Y78F] (last updated Mar. 3, 2019).
30
But see discussion infra note 42.
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services, etc.).31 The State further restricted their ability to operate
independent businesses.32 Some Israeli officials used derogatory
and delegitimizing terms when referring to this population.33 All of
these measures have resulted in their social marginalization and
extreme vulnerability. These different measures were effective in
prompting many of these people to leave the country and seek
refuge and safety elsewhere. Of the 65,000 undocumented entrants
who entered Israel since 2007, only around 37,000 were still residing
in Israel at the end of 2017.34
These different exclusionary policies have sparked litigation.
Petitions of individuals and human rights organizations challenged
the fundamental aspects of the exclusionary regime applied by
Israel, including: immigration detention35 and the conditions

31
Galia Sabar & Elizabeth Tsurkov, Israel’s Policies toward Asylum-Seekers:
2002–2014,
ISTITUTO
AFFARI
INTERNAZIONALI
(May
20,
2015),
https://www.osce.org/networks/newmedtrackII/165436?download=true
[https://perma.cc/7AAU-ZS94].
32
To get a permit to open a business, a person must be a resident of Israel.
These new regulations emerged around 2010. Eritreans and Sudanese have tried to
bypass these regulations by using third parties as the “faces” of their businesses.
See Tally Kritzman-Amir & Anda Barak-Bianco, Food as Means of Control: On Food
and Asylum Law and Policy in Israel, in FOOD AND THE LAW 597, 614-615 (Yofi Tirosh
& Aeyal Gross eds., 2017) (in Hebrew).
33
Tsurkov, supra note 18 at 10, 13 (noting that statements from Israeli
politicians and decision-makers include claims that an “overwhelming majority of
those claiming asylum in Israel are ‘illegal work infiltrators’ and not genuine
refugees,” that “15% of the asylum-seekers ask for protection because spirits are
haunting them,” that asylum-seekers are “a cancer in our body” and that asylum
seekers are “‘infiltrators,’ ‘criminals,’ a ‘demographic threat’ and worse”).
34
2018 Data of PIA, supra note 6, at 4–5.
35
The Court invalidated parts of the law three times. See HCJ 7146/12 Adam
v. The Knesset 64(2) PD 717, 745 (2013) (Isr.); File No. 7385/13, 8425/13 High Court
of Justice (Jerusalem), Eitan—Israeli Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli
Government (Sept. 22, 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)
(Isr.) [hereinafter Eitan decision]; File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice
(Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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thereof,36
expulsion,37
geographical
restrictions,38
salary
reductions,39 refusal to naturalize,40 the documents’ renewal
services,41 and the poor access to social and economic rights.42
In many of these cases, the Supreme Court struck down
significant policy measures or parts thereof, thus introducing
36
The Court accepted the petition in part and ordered to prevent
overcrowding in the mandatory residence center as well as enable residents to
possess cleaning materials in File No. 4386/16 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem)
Madio v. Commission of Prisons (June 13, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). The Court accepted the petition in part and allowed
the residents to enter ready-made food to their rooms though denied their request
to cook for themselves in File No. 4581/15 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Ismail
v. Comptroller of Prisons (Nov. 19, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.). The State committed to improve residents’ access to computers in
light of a pending petition in File No. 4389/16 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem),
Tespaisius v. Comptroller of Prisons (June 25, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
37
The Court upheld third countries’ agreements but ruled that a person’s
dismay at removal cannot serve as a cause for his or her detention when the State
declares that it does not remove against people’s will. File No. 8101/15
Administrative Appeals, Zegete v. Minister of the Interior (Aug. 28, 2017), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
38
The State abolished the policy in light of the petition. For discussion, see
supra note 24 and accompanying text. See also File No. 5616/09 High Court of Justice
(Jerusalem), African Refugee Development Center v. Minister of Interior (Aug. 26,
2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); File No. 10463/08
High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), African Refugees Development Center v.
Minister of Interior (Aug. 6, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.).
39
HCJ 2293/17 Zagai Gresgher v. The Knesset (pending) (Isr.).
40
The Jerusalem District Court sitting as an Administrative Appeals Court
denied petitioners’ argument that a long stay in Israel as a refugee entitles a person
to permanent residency status or even naturalization. File No. 10-03-35344
Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem), Galan v. Minister of Interior (Apr. 15, 2012),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). A petition against this
decision is still pending in the Israeli Supreme Court. See File No. 4288/12,
Administrative Petition, John Doe v. Minister of Interior (pending) (Isr.).
41
The Court denied the petition, without discussing it on the merits, as the
petitioners had an alternative remedy by petitioning the administrative courts. File
No. 7501/17 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Hotline for Refugees and Migrants
v. Minister of Interior (May 9, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.).
42
On the consent granted by a municipality to enroll children of these
populations in public schools in the shadow of a petition, see File No. 6162/12
Administrative Appeals, Eilat Municipality v. Maged Mangan (Aug. 27, 2012) (Isr.).
On the State’s commitment not to enforce the law forbidding employers to employ
people who entered Israel through a non-recognized border and lack permit to
work, see File No. 6312/10 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Kav LaOved v.
Government (Jan. 16, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)
(Isr.).
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significant changes into Israel’s policies with regard to asylum
seekers. In some of the cases, the State conceded to grant these
people various rights in the shadow of a pending petition. In the
immigration detention context, the tension between the branches of
government has peaked since the Court struck down sections of the
law authorizing immigration detention three times within a twoyear period, leading the legislature to redraft it each time anew.43
Aware of the high-stakes of this heated dialogue between the
branches of government, the Court used various strategies—
including the use of constitutional avoidance and comparative
law—to mitigate the tension with the representative branches.44
The Court had repeatedly exhibited judicial activism, despite the
fact that immigration matters—which are infused with profound
social, financial, and security-related issues—are traditionally
viewed as matters within the sovereign realm of the executive and
the legislature.45 By doing this, the Court attempted to fulfill its
counter-majoritarian role, protecting the rights of the disempowered
and politically under-represented (or, in this case, unrepresented)
minority group of undocumented entrants. Yet at the same time, the
Court risked retaliation and curtailment of judicial power. The
government and some of the political parties which support it
responded to some of these Court’s decisions in an extreme manner,
threatening to curtail the Court’s power. They initiated bills to
amend the Basic Laws of the State of Israel, which the Court treats
as Israel’s formal supreme constitution,46 but that enjoy light
entrenchment so that the Knesset may amend them in most
instances by a simple majority.47 Of particular importance in this
context is coalition members’ bills that would have incorporated a
general override clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,
to allow the Knesset to re-enact laws struck down by the Court to
protect constitutional rights.48 The former Minister of Justice, Ayelet

See supra note 35.
See infra Parts 3 and 4.
45 See, e.g., HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior 61 P.D. 202 (2006) (Isr.).
46
See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Collective Vill. 49(4)
PD 221 (1995) (Isr.).
47
Rivka Weill, Reconciling Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Review: On the
Theoretical and Historical Origins of the Israeli Legislative Override Power, 39 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 457 (2012); Rivka Weill, Hybrid Constitutionalism: The Israeli Case for
Judicial Review and Why We Should Care, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 349 (2012).
48 See Jonathan Lis & Revital Hovel, Right-Wing Ministers Unveil Bill to Let
Knesset
Override
Supreme
Court,
HAARETZ
(Dec.
20,
2017),
43
44
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Shaked, made it a goal to “pack” the Court with conservative justices
through judicial appointments (but with no attempt to increase the
size of the Court).49 The legal drama, in addition to the human
drama, weighed heavily on the Court as it dealt with these
migration-related cases.
This Article argues that the Israeli Supreme Court took a
courageous judicial stance intended to protect the constitutional
rights of the weakest members of Israeli society, determining that
undocumented entrants’ rights are constitutionally protected, even
at the price of taking heat from the representative branches.50 At the
same time, many of its decisions were formalistic, even technical,
and did not address in a substantial way some of the major
constitutional or international law issues on the agenda. Most
importantly, by choosing the formalistic path, the Court failed to
hold the representative branches accountable for their policy choices
regarding undocumented entrants. Thus, even after the Court’s
decisions, these branches could argue that the population at hand is
comprised of economic migrants. The Court should have compelled
the representative branches to conduct an effective and fair RSD
process that would yield decisions within a reasonable time,
whether the individuals are migrant workers or refugees. The Court
should have further treated the length of a person’s presence in the
country as a consideration that may lead to the acquisition of rights.
We suggest that these formalistic and reductionist approaches were
a conscious strategic attempt on the part of the Court to downplay
the significance of its decisions. But the Court’s strategy of leaving
ambiguity in its treatment of the substantive issues has backfired,
and the costs of this decision outweigh the benefits. The heavy
prices of this approach are borne by the political branches (including
the Court) and ultimately, by the Israeli society and, perhaps most
of all, by the undocumented entrants, which the Court sought to
protect. This human and legal drama should be studied closely by
any country that confronts similar dilemmas.
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-bill-would-let-knessetoverridesupreme-court-1.5629190.
49
Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked, Shaked: The Process of Changing the Supreme
Court Has Ended, ISR. NAT’L NEWS (Feb. 23, 2018, 02:28 AM),
https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/242313
[https://perma.cc/8MZD-PAQ7].
50
Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (discussing the civil status of
people as one of the considerations affecting the question whether they enjoy
constitutional rights).
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Our criticism of the Israeli approach is especially applicable to
Trump’s recent asylum ban,51 which if upheld by the Court in Trump
v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant,52 will lead to results similar to those
already evident in Israel. Trump’s asylum ban would mean that
refugees otherwise entitled to full protection would enjoy mere
protection against removal. The implications for the asylum seekers
and society at large of a policy that leaves people in a liminal state
of mere protection from removal are manifest in the Israeli story and
should serve as a warning to the U.S.
Interestingly, it was the lower courts, particularly the
Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the Israeli equivalent of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA),53 that occasionally stood up to the
challenge and started to impose on the administrative branches the
costs of failing to reach individual RSD decisions in a timely
fashion.54 A similar judicial pattern, in which lower courts are on
occasion more “courageous” than the Supreme Court in guarding
asylum seekers’ rights, is manifested in the U.S. as well, and this
Article reveals this dynamic when discussing the Jennings v.
Rodriguez case. 55
Part 2 of this Article argues that at times courts may
courageously protect rights yet fail in their ultimate task of holding
the political branches accountable. In the Israeli context, although
the Court invalidated immigration detention three times in two
Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57661 (Nov. 9, 2018).
So far, the Federal District Courts issued a temporary restraining order,
followed by a preliminary injunction. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932
F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018) (order); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F.Supp.3d
1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (order granting temporary injunction); Trump v. E. Bay
Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S. Ct. 782, 202 L.Ed.2d 510 (2018) (order in pending case),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/122118zr_986b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FG72-LJVB].
53
Immigration
Appeal
Tribunal,
KAN-TOR
&
ACCO,
https://www.ktalegal.com/israel-immigration/immigration-appeal-tribunal
[https://perma.cc/F628-H8FP]. In the Israeli immigration system, the Population
and Immigration Authority clerks make the initial decisions. Individuals may
appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal to review these decisions. They may
later further appeal to the District Court sitting as an Administrative Court and
ultimately to the Supreme Court. Id. In the U.S., individuals may appeal the
decisions of asylum officers to the immigration judges, then to the Board of
Immigration Appeals, then to Circuit Courts, and finally to the Supreme Court. See
United States Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals
[https://perma.cc/N8LC-Q9K2].
54
See discussion infra Part 2.
55
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
51
52
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years, it did not use the force of constitutional law to require the
representative branches to account for who the individual people
are and what rights they acquired as a result of their lengthy
presence in the country. Parts 3 and 4 elaborate on the various
strategies courts may employ to reduce the tension with the
representative branches and their shortcomings. Constitutional
avoidance may be more interventionist than invalidation.
Comparative law may be used without according enough weight to
distinguishing factors. These arguments are shown in the Israeli
Court’s treatment of immigration detention as well as agreements to
remove undocumented entrants to third countries. Particularly, the
Court relied heavily on U.S. case law when making some of its
decisions, though it should have better accounted for the similarities
and differences between the two legal regimes.
2. AVOIDANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUES
Perhaps the most evident example of the manner in which the
Israeli Supreme Court was determined to protect the rights of this
vulnerable population is a series of cases dealing with the
constitutionality of the detention of undocumented entrants.
Paradoxically, the Court invalidated immigration detention
legislation three times without using any of these cases as an
opportunity to hold the political branches accountable regarding the
most basic question of whether these people should be treated as
refugees.
2.1. Engaging in a Three-Stage Judicial Review of Immigration
Detention
When the first Sudanese immigrants entered Israel
clandestinely, through the Egyptian border, Israel’s Ministry of
Justice responded by invoking an old law, titled the Prevention of
Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction) (The Infiltration Law).56
The Knesset enacted the Prevention of Infiltration Law in 1954 to
allow for the criminalization, detention, and removal of
56
Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction), 5714-1954, SH
No. 16 p. 160 (as amended in 2012) (Isr.).
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undocumented entrants into Israel.57 At the time, the State enacted
the statute as a state of emergency law and justified it with the need
to prevent the entry of terrorists into the country.58 The security and
military apparatuses authorized and executed these detentions and
removals. The law provided for administrative tribunals, consisting
of military personnel, who tried the cases as courts of first instance
and appellate courts. The decisions of these tribunals were final
with no right of appeal to civil courts.59 The law targeted citizens,
residents, or visitors from Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen.60 Israel considered all of these countries
“enemy states” at the time of the bill’s passage.
In January 2006, Israel began to apply the law to Sudanese
immigrants, some of whom were victims of the harsh events, often
classified as genocide, perpetrated in Darfur, as well as entrants
from others areas of North and South Sudan.61 The executive branch
justified its application of the law to this population on the basis of
general security considerations because of the poor relations (or lack
thereof) between Israel and Sudan.62 Israel applied a parallel law,
the Entry into Israel Law of 1952, to other undocumented entrants
from non-enemy countries, authorizing shorter immigration
detention periods of typically up to sixty days, subject to judicial
review, in civil detention facilities rather than in military facilities. 63
Individual detainees challenged the use of the Infiltration Law
against Sudanese immigrants in the Supreme Court (sitting as a
High Court of Justice) in 2006.64 In July 2008, the State committed in
Court to transferring undocumented entrants caught by the security
forces to civil detention facilities ran by the immigration authority
Id. §§ 2–30.
Id. §34.
59 Id. §§ 11–23; see also Yonatan Berman, Detention of Refugees and Asylum
Seekers in Israel, in WHERE LEVINSKI MEETS ASMARA: ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES
IN ISRAEL- SOCIAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 147, 188 (Tally Kritzman-Amir ed., 2015) (in
Hebrew).
60
Id. §1 amended in 2012; see also HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset 64(2) PD
717, ¶ 11 (2013) (Vogelman, J., opinion) (Isr.).
61
See Petition for Israeli Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting HCJ
3208/06 Adam Gubara Tagal v. The Prime Minister (Oct. 7, 2008) (Isr.),
http://www.israelbar.org.il/uploadfiles/darpurs_refugees.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N4G6-KFLD] (Isr.); see also Berman, supra note 59, at 187.
62
Kritzman-Amir & Ramji-Nogales, supra note 13.
63
Entry into Israel Law 6712-1952, SH No. 354 (Isr.).
64
HCJ 3208/06 4 Anonymous Parties v. The Head of the Operations Division
in the Israeli Defense Forces (Oct. 7, 2008) (Isr.).
57
58
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within two to three days. Within fourteen days of a person’s
detention in such facilities, the State will bring the detainee before
an adjudicator to review the detention under the Entry into Israel
Law. Only if the security forces found that there are unique
individual circumstances that justify it, may the State deviate from
this legal arrangement. This decision practically meant that the State
committed to refrain from using the Infiltration Law against
Sudanese immigrants, who enter through the Egyptian border. The
State accepted the position of the petitioners, the district courts, and
even army personnel, that it may not apply a presumption of
dangerousness against these people. This commitment forms part
of the Court’s decision in 2008.65
But five years later, in 2012, the Israeli legislature introduced an
amendment to the Infiltration Law, authorizing the three-year
detention of undocumented entrants, and the possibly indefinite
detention of enemy nationals, including the Sudanese.66 The High
Court of Justice struck down this amendment, as well as two
subsequent amendments to the Infiltration Law or provisions
thereof, forcing the legislature to redraft them multiple times.67
In the Adam decision of September 2013, the Court ruled that a
three-year immigration detention period amounted to a criminal
penalty, and an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutional
right to liberty of these undocumented entrants, and struck down a
section of the statute.68
The legislature quickly responded by amending the statute in a
speedy legislative process, creating a two-track system: the
undocumented entrants would be in detention for a year, and the
State may further place them in a designated residency center
65
See Berman, supra note 59, at 189; see also HCJ 3208/06 4 Anonymous Parties
v. The Head of the Operations Division in the Israeli Defense Forces (Oct. 7, 2008)
(Isr.) (updating announcement of the respondents to the Court, July 10, 2007).
66
Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction) (Amendment no.
3 and Temporary Provisions), 5772-2012, SH No. 2332 p. 119, §§30A (C)(3), 30A
(D)(3) (Isr.).
67
Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction) (Amendment no.
3 and Temporary Provisions), 5772-2012, SH No. 2332 p. 119 (Isr.) [hereinafter
Amendment 3]; Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction)
(Amendment no. 4 and Temporary Provisions), 5774-2013, SH No. 2419 p. 74 (Isr.)
[hereinafter Amendment 4]; Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and
Jurisdiction) (Amendments and Temporary Provisions), 5775-2014, 5775-2014, SH
No. 2483 p. 84 (Isr.) [hereinafter Amendment 5]. Prevention of Infiltration Law
(Offenses and Jurisdiction) (Temporary Provisions), 5778-2017, SH No. 2673 p. 60
(Isr.) [hereinafter Amendment 6].
68
HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset 64(2) PD 717, 745 (2013) (Isr.).
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indefinitely. The statute itself was enacted as a temporary measure
valid for three years.69 Simultaneously, the State opened a residency
center right next to the detention facility, in the far south of Israel,
remote from any settlement. The statute imposed severe restrictions
on the freedom of movement of the “residents,” who had to report
three times throughout the day (morning, noon, and evening) to the
detention officers within the facility.70
These requirements
effectively prevented them from leaving the facility. The prison
authority ran the residency center and subjected the “residents” to
administrative sanctions if they disobeyed the rules, which included
transfer to the immigration detention facility.
In September 2014, the Court decided in the Eitan case—a second
petition against the constitutionality of the Infiltration Law—to
strike down this new version of the statute.71 The Court held that
the year-long detention period was an unconstitutional
infringement of the undocumented entrants’ right to liberty.72 It
further found the nature of the “residency center” problematic since
the various restrictions imposed on the undocumented entrants
made it almost indistinguishable from a detention facility.73
The legislature amended the statute for the second time by
liberalizing the detention scheme.74 It shortened the maximum
immigration detention period from a year to three months.75 It cut
down the stay period in the residency center to twenty months and
granted the residents some more freedom of movement, having
them report to the facility authorities only once a day, at night.76
But petitioners brought a third petition before the Court,
challenging the constitutionality of the newly amended law. In the
Desta case,77 the Court ruled that one must read into the immigration
detention scheme an implied condition that the State cannot detain
Amendment 4, supra note 67, §30A, ch. 4.
Amendment 4, supra note 67. Regulations to Prevent Infiltration (Offenses
and Jurisdiction) (Presence of Resident within the Center and Exit from the Center)
(Provisional Provisions), 2013, KT 308.
71
File No. 7385/13, 8425/13 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Eitan—Israeli
Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli Government (Sept. 22, 2014), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Amendment 5, supra note 67.
75
Amendment 5, supra note 67.
76
Amendment 5, supra note 67.
77
File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset
(Aug. 11, 2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
69
70
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undocumented entrants even for three months, unless the detention
serves the purpose of their identification and removal (whether
voluntary or forced). This implies that since Israel was not refouling
people to Sudan and Eritrea due to their unstable political climate,
it could not hold Sudanese and Eritrean immigrants in detention for
the entire three-month period, but rather had to release them upon
their identification.78 The Court further ruled that a mandatory
twenty-month long residence in a residency center is
unconstitutional since it constitutes too great an infringement of the
right to liberty.79 Accordingly, the Court invalidated the lengthy
mandatory residency period but suspended the remedy for six
months.80 During this period of six months, the State would not be
permitted to hold persons for longer than twelve months in the
residency center. The Court further ordered that the State should
immediately release those held for longer at the time of decision.81
Following this decision, the Knesset introduced a new amendment,
shortening the duration of the stay in the residency center to a
maximum of twelve months.82 A subsequent amendment closed
down the residency center as of March 15, 2018, since the
government believed that it did not serve its purpose any more.83
In this series of judicial decisions, the Court displayed judicial
activism in striking down three versions of the same law in two
years. It led the legislature to cut down the immigration detention
period from three years to three months, coupled by a year-long stay
in a residency center. This repeated confrontation between the
branches of government thus led, at least in principle, to significant
Id. ¶ 5, 41 (Naor, Pres., opinion).
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. ¶ 115.
82
Amendment 6, supra note 67.
83
The government closed the center thinking it was no longer needed in light
of its intention to transfer the undocumented migrants, in accordance with bilateral
agreements reached with third countries, which the Court had upheld. Prevention
of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction) (Temporary Provisions), 5778–2017,
HH No. 1167 p. 84, at 85 (Isr.). In media interviews and tweets, officials further
justified the decision to close down the Holot residency center by explaining that it
no longer deters undocumented migrants from staying in Israel, in light of Court
decisions that have improved the living conditions and freedom of movement of
those held there. They also argued that running the facility was very expensive and
some of the funds could be used to hire more inspectors and remove more people.
See Sue Surkes & AFP, Ministers vote to close Holot migrant detention center, THE TIMES
OF ISRAEL (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/ministers-vote-to-closeholot-migrant-detention-center/ [https://perma.cc/6GF5-9SQ5].
78
79
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improvements in the protection of the constitutional right to liberty
of undocumented entrants.
2.2. Failing to Determine Who These Migrants Are
2.2.1. The Failure to Require Accountability
Nevertheless, remarkably, the Court introduced this dramatic
change in the immigration detention regime without requiring the
authorities to determine whether the detained persons were
refugees or economic migrants. While the legal categorization of
undocumented entrants is sometimes challenging,84 it is obviously
critical, as there are clear legal obligations which derive from
characterizing people as refugees.
The Court was unable to rely on either the State or the petitioners
for the legal categorization of these undocumented entrants. This is
because the State prevented their access to the RSD process until
2013,85 and granted them instead, a group-based protection from
refoulement, with very limited access to social and economic rights,
as detailed above.86 The state’s terminology and reasons for
extending only group-based rather than individual-based
protection changed over time, but it was nevertheless clear that
these are persons who cannot be returned to their countries of
origin.87 The Court criticized the State’s heavy reliance on
prolonged group-based protection without determining the
duration of such protection,88 without grounding this form of
protection in procedures or regulations, and without anchoring the

84
See TALLY KRITZMAN-AMIR, SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFUGEES (2009) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Tel Aviv University) (on file with author) (regarding the blurry lines
between the category of “refugee” and that of “economic migrant”).
85
File No. 3844-17 Court of Appeals, John Doe & Others v. Ministry of
Interior—Population and Immigration Authority (Dec. 13, 2017), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
86 See supra Part I.
87
HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D. 717, para. 112 (2013), (Arbel,
J., opinion) (Isr.).
88
AdminA 8908/11 Nesenet Argey Asefu v. The Ministry of Interior, para. 16
(2011) (Vogelman, J., opinion) (Isr.); HCJ, 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D.
717, para. 9 (2013) (Arbel, J., opinion) (Isr.).
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rights of the protected persons.89 At the same time, the Court
refrained from prohibiting the State to use this form of protection.
The reliance on group-based temporary protection was not unique
to Israel: other countries have relied on temporary protection in
cases of large-scale undocumented entry, though Israel applied the
protection without enabling access to individual RSD for many
years.90
Group-based temporary protection has the advantage of
granting immediate relief without the need for a case-by-case
determination of refugee status, which is costly and
administratively burdensome for states. It is a regime of fewer
rights to more people: it can also cover populations which without
it would not be entitled to protection, but in the absence of a binding
international instrument codifying this regime, temporary
protection grants those protected fewer rights. It is intended,
however, to be a temporary regime. States cannot substitute their
obligations under the Refugee Convention with group-based
temporary protection.91 Additionally, whereas states must meet
clear standards for the termination of the protection of refugees,92
there are no such standards for the termination of temporary
protection.93
Granting temporary protection also allows states to postpone
dealing with individual persons, since they are handled as members
of their group of nationality, or as demographics. Individuals do
89 See id. (Hayut J., opinion); HCJ, 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D.
717, para. 9 (2013) (Arbel, J., opinion) (Isr.).
90
See Randall Hansen, et al., Report on the Workshop on Refugee and Asylum
Policy in Practice in Europe and North America, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 801, 809 (2000)
(“The issue of how long protection should remain temporary if conflict continues
received considerable attention. Current policies vary considerably, from three
years in Holland to seven years in the United Kingdom.”).
91
Joan Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized
Regime, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 279 (2000); Joseph Pugliese, The Incommensurability of Law
to Justice: Refugees and Australia’s Temporary Protection Visa, 16 L. & LITERATURE 285,
296–98 (2004); Scott Reynolds, European Council Directive 2001/55/EC: Toward a
Common European Asylum System, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 359 (2002).
92
Refugee Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(C). Under the section, the
protection of the Convention shall cease to apply to a refugee if, inter alia, “[h]e can
no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of
the protection of the country of his nationality; Provided that this paragraph shall
not apply to a refugee falling under section A(1) of this article who is able to invoke
compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself
of the protection of the country of nationality”. Id. art. 1(C)(5).
93
Joan Fitzpatrick, supra note 91, at 284.
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not need—nor get the opportunity—to tell their stories and establish
a well-founded fear of persecution. Instead, it is sufficient that they
prove their nationality. Their voice is unheard, their humanity
unexposed, and they do not seem relatable. They are not perceived
in their entirety, but rather their existence is narrowed down to their
“otherness.”94
In lieu of requiring the State to make a determination on the
international status of the individuals, the Israeli Supreme Court
referred to the individuals subject to this immigration detention
regime as “infiltrators”.95 While the use of this term is technically
justifiable, as this is the term used in the legislation itself,96 it is also
a derogatory term. The term implies bad faith on the part of the
undocumented entrant, as well as possibly a harmful intent.
“Infiltrators” is a term that directs the focus on the undocumented
entry, while “refugees” is a term that focuses on the reasons which
are behind the decision to leave the country of citizenship or
residency. “Infiltrators” is also a term that maintains the framing of
these individuals as the impersonal “others.” These implied
meanings did not escape the Court, and though some of the Justices
hesitated using this term, they nevertheless chose to continue using
it as the appropriate legalistic term under Israeli law.97 Further, the
Court used this term, while admitting it is difficult to establish the
correct categorization of these individuals.98
It is difficult to understand how the Court could have made
decisions on the matter of immigration detention without
distinguishing between different types of undocumented entrants
and without requiring the State to reach a decision within a
reasonable and predefined period of time in pending applications
for refugee protection. The categorization has an impact on the
94
Tally Kritzman-Amir, “Otherness” as the Underlying Principle in Israel’s
Asylum Regime, 42 ISR. L. REV. 603, 619 (2009).
95
HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D. 717, 745 (2013); File No.
7385/13, 8425/13 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Eitan—Israeli Immigration
Policy Center v. The Israeli Government (Sept. 22, 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem),
Desta v. The Knesset para. 4 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
96
Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction), supra note 22.
97
HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D. 717, paras. 10–12 (2013),
(Vogelman, J., concurring opinion) (Isr.).
98
File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice, Desta v. The Knesset (Aug. 11, 2015)
(Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); HCJ
7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D. 717, paras. 7–8 (2013) (Vogelman, J.,
opinion) (Isr.).
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rights of the undocumented entrants under both international and
constitutional law. Arguably, the constitutionality of the length of
detention may differ when the detained are refugees or economic
migrants.
The proper categorization of the undocumented entrants was an
issue that explicitly came up before the Court. The parties to the
different petitions raised the dispute as to the characterization of
these individuals and thus this was an issue that the Court could
have tackled.99 The Court should have created a rebuttable
presumption of refugee status in favor of these people, if the State
did not make a determination within the defined period. Such a
ruling could have incentivized the government to conduct efficient
RSD processes. This position would have also been supported by
international refugee law, which views recognizing the refugee
status of a person as merely declaratory and allows states to refrain
from processing migrants through individualized RSDs, so long as
they grant them the same rights-protections as granted to
refugees.100 Such a ruling would have also been in line with the
Israeli immigration detention norms, which instructed the State to
release from immigration detention asylum seekers who submitted
asylum application, if those applications were not examined within
three months, or whose RSD was not completed within nine
months.101
Since the Court refrained from requiring the State to determine
whether these migrants are refugees or economic migrants, it did
not confront the complexities of the Israeli RSD process. As
mentioned above, PIA admitted in the Israeli legislature that it
granted less than 0.1% of asylum seekers from Sudan and Eritrea
refugee status.102 Such markedly low recognition rates differ

99 See, e.g., File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset para. 5 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). However, the petitioners’ position was that even if
the detained are not refugees, they should not be detained since they are not
deportable. Petition in HCJ 8665/14 Desta v. The Knesset, paras. 158–59 (Dec. 18,
2014)
(Isr.),
https://law.acri.org.il/pdf/petitions/hit8665.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GKM9-DFXB)].
100
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
154–92 (Cambridge University Press 2005).
101
See HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D. 717, para. 37 (2013)
(Vogelman, J., opinion) (Isr.).
102 See supra Part I.
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significantly from those of other democracies.103 UNHCR, as well as
Israel’s own State Comptroller, have criticized the Israeli treatment
of Eritreans and Sudanese, calling its RSD processes unfair and
ineffective.104 The Israeli Supreme Court criticized this exclusionary
asylum regime on a handful of occasions,105 but it never went ahead
and required the State to conduct a fair RSD process, even when this
remedy was specifically requested.106 Nor did the Court apply a
103
In comparison, in EU member states, in the third quarter of 2017,
recognition rates of Eritrean and Sudanese as refugees were 54.45% (3,330 out of
6,060) and 50.2% (1,200 out of 2,390) respectively. See First instance decisions by
outcome and recognition rates, 30 main citizenships of asylum applicants granted decisions
in the EU-28, 3rd quarter 2017, EUROSTAT STATISTICS EXPLAINED (Dec. 13, 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/File:First_instance_decisions_by_outcome_and_recognition
_rates,_30_main_citizenships_of_asylum_applicants_granted_decisions_in_the_E
U-28,_3rd_quarter_2017.png [https://perma.cc/9GMJ-KSCN].
A higher
percentage of the Eritreans and Sudanese enjoys other protections. The
undocumented migrants entering Israel may very well have been different from
those reaching Europe even when they came from the same countries. To enter into
Israel, one had to walk, rather than cross oceans. But even that cannot explain the
sharp different recognition rates of Israel and Europe.
104
UNHCR’s position on the status of Eritrean and Sudanese nationals defined as
‘infiltrators’
by
Israel,
UNHCR
1–2
(Nov.
2017),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a5889584.html
[https://perma.cc/34R6CB3Z]; State Comptroller’s Annual Report, supra note 10, at 1419–64.
105
See, e.g., File No. 7385/13, 8425/13 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem),
Eitan—Israeli Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli Government, para. 35 (Sept.
22, 2014) (Vogelman, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.) (“A comparative view shows that the world-wide percentage of
approval for asylum requests submitted by Eritrean and Sudanese nationals – the
countries of origin of the majority of the infiltrators in Israel—are significantly
greater than the percentage in Israel. In 2012 (the last year with updated figures),
the worldwide percentage for the recognition of Eritreans as refugees was 81.9%,
and 68.2% for Sudanese (see the current Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, pp. 102, 104). According to the figures provided
by the State, which are current as of March 3, 2014, it appears that less than 1% of
asylum requests submitted in Israel by Eritrean nationals were approved, and not
even one requests from Sudanese nationals was approved [ . . . ]”); File No. 8665/14
High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset, para. 3 (Aug. 11, 2015)
(Hayut, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.)
(“Thus, from July 2009 until Feb. 5, 2015, a total of nine asylum requests submitted
by Sudanese and Eritrean nationals were approved, and 1,037 requests were
denied. This data puts the rate of approval for asylum requests submitted in that
period by Sudanese and Eritrean nationals in Israel at about 0.9%. When this figure
is compared to the percentage of asylum requests of these nationals worldwide, the
comparison itself raises questions as to the manner in which the state examines and
decides upon such requests, as what comes out is a product of what goes in”).
106
In petitions attacking the fact that the State dragged its feet and refrained
from deciding cases of Sudanese asylum seekers from areas of ongoing conflict, the
Court agreed to continuous extensions to allow the State excessive time for the
completion of refugee status determination. See File No. 4630/17 High Court of

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

68

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:1

presumption that they are refugees, given the State’s failure to
determine their status. For the State, it was probably preferable to
be seen as slow to determine individual cases, rather than be
perceived as rejecting Sudanese and Eritrean asylum seekers at a
disproportionately higher rate than do other countries.107 The Court
let the representative branches get away with this ambiguity.
2.2.2. The Accountability Role of Courts
It is a primary task of courts to bring the political branches to
account for their actions. Even without the power to invalidate
statutes, courts have an array of powers that allow them to expose
the true nature of political action as well as make the issue before
them salient. The courts may contribute to a culture that demands
honesty, deliberation, and accountability, helping to create a more
informed and conscious decision-making process for society at
large. By exposing the true nature of political action, the courts
enable democratic processes to kick in and civil society to exert
pressure on decision-makers, potentially deterring action that, if not
for the exposure, would have been pursued.
The role of the courts in holding other branches accountable is
manifest in various common law doctrines. One example is the
maxim that the legislature must explicitly empower the
administrative branch to infringe rights, otherwise the courts would
interpret the grant of authority as not including such power.108 The
requirement of explicitness is a form of accountability. The
constitutional avoidance doctrine, which enables courts to prefer a
statutory interpretation that aligns with the constitution rather than
Justice (Jerusalem), Adam Gubara Tagal v. The Prime Minister (Oct. 29, 2018) (in
Hebrew) (Isr.); see also HCJ 4630/17 Adam Gubara Tagal v. The Prime Minister
(Dec. 17, 2018) (Isr.) (updating Response on Behalf of the Respondents).
107
As discussed in the text accompanying notes 8 & 9, the State’s legal position
on the forced army draft prevented most Eritreans from receiving protection. This
legal position was overturned by the lower tribunal in the Mesegene Case. See File
No. 1010-14 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), John Doe v. Ministry of Interior (Feb. 15,
2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). The State has
appealed this decision, but withdrew the appeal before the District Court reached
a decision. See File No. 12154-04/18 Administrative Appeals, The State of Israel—
The Population and Immigration Authority v. Joe Doe (Feb. 15, 2018) (in Hebrew)
(Isr.).
108
See Rivka Weill, Juxtaposing Constitution-Making and ConstitutionalInfringement Mechanisms in Israel and Canada: On the Interplay between Common Law
Override and Sunset Override, 49 ISR. L. REV. 103, 108 (2016).
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one that would lead to the incompatibility and invalidity of a statute,
may be interpreted in a similar vein.109 If the political branches
disagree with the statutory interpretation adopted under the
constitutional avoidance doctrine, they may make their will to
infringe rights more explicit. The non-delegation doctrine enables
the invalidation of administrative action, because the issue should
be dealt with by the legislature, not the executive.110 It, too, is an
accountability mechanism that prevents the legislature from
escaping responsibility by delegation to the regulatory bodies.
The beauty of this arsenal of tools is that the courts are within
their traditional roles as interpreters or supervisors of the
administrative branch, which is compatible even with a
parliamentary sovereignty system. Yet, they may powerfully
change the incentives of the political actors. Once the political actors
understand that they will pay a significant political price for their
actions, they may change course. Justice Louise Brandeis rightly
said: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman.”111
Even the explicit legislative override mechanism found in
Canada and Israel owes its birth to this accountability idea.112 The
legislature may infringe constitutional rights, but must override
them explicitly in a statute, thus, giving full accountability for its
actions. The same applies for the British and New Zealand noncompatibility frameworks, which enable courts to declare a statute
incompatible with certain rights without striking the statute
down.113 This time the courts are the ones to extract a political price
from the legislature through publicity.
While the Israeli Supreme Court courageously invalidated three
statutes or provisions thereof in a two-year period to protect the
right to liberty of undocumented entrants, it failed to use these
109
110
111

(2009).

See infra Part 3.1.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92

112
See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, §33 (U.K.);
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5752, SH No. 1454 p. 90, § 4 (Isr.).
113
See, e.g., Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (UK); Taylor v. Attorney General
[2018] NZSC 104 (N.Z.); Rivka Weill, Exploring constitutional statutes in common law
systems, in QUASI-CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES: FORMS,
FUNCTIONS, APPLICATIONS 64 (Richard Albert & Joel I. Colón-Ríos eds., Routledge
2019) [hereinafter Weill, Constitutional Statutes].
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opportunities to hold the representative branches accountable on
the most fundamental question of all: deciding the identity of the
individuals composing the group and the corresponding obligations
of the State deriving from it. Despite criticizing the State’s heavy
reliance on a prolonged group-based protection, the Court refrained
from forcing the State to make individual determinations on the
status of these people nor grant them broader comparable rights to
refugees.
2.2.3. The Constitutional and International Law Implications
It could be argued that the Court impliedly applied norms of
refugee law to this population without determining explicitly that
they are either refugees or presumptively refugees (until proven
otherwise) for the sake of immigration detention. For example, the
Court referred to Article 31 of the Refugee Convention,114 which
instructs:
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account
of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly
from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the
sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to
the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or
presence.
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of
such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and
such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the
country is regularized or they obtain admission into another
country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a
reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission
into another country.115
This section conveys an understanding of the international
community that refugees are often not in a position to obtain travel
documents and entry permits to the countries to which they flee, and
prohibits penalizing them for their undocumented entry or
presence.
114
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset, paras. 44, 68 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
115
Refugee Convention, supra note 8.
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The Queen’s Bench Division in the U.K. interpreted the article to
apply to asylum seekers, prior to their being recognized as refugees.
It thus held that asylum seekers should not be prosecuted for
possessing false documents on arrival in the U.K.116 It held that
entry could only be gained in many cases by the use of false
documents.117 This result aligns with a perception of refugee status
as merely declarative, rather than constitutive. 118
Allegedly, “[t]he expression “coming directly” in Article 31(1),
covers the situation of a person who enters the country in which
asylum is sought directly from the country of origin, or from another
country where his protection, safety and security could not be
assured. It is understood that this term also covers a person who
transits an intermediate country for a short period of time without
having applied for, or received, asylum there.”119 In the Israeli
context, it would also apply to persons who have entered Israel after
crossing through Egypt, but could not receive protection there. The
Court refers to this section in the Refugee Convention, but refrains
from explaining why it applies to the migrants at hand.120 At the
same time, the Court interprets the section as allowing detention
116
See Regina v Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court and another, Ex p Adimi Regina
v Crown Prosecution Service, Ex p Sorani Regina v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, Ex p Sorani Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department and
another, ex p Kaziu [2001] Q.B. 667, 674 , https://www-iclr-couk.proxy.library.upenn.edu/document/2001002662/casereport_65817/html?quer
y=2001+Q.B.+667+&filter=&fullSearchFields=&page=1&sort=relevance&pageSize
=10# [https://perma.cc/UUV4-38Q8].
117
Id.
118
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR): “A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951
Convention as soon as he fulfils the criteria contained in the definition. This would
necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee status is formally
determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a
refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of
recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.” UNHCR, Handbook and
Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, para. 28 U.N. Doc.
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3
(Dec.
2011),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html%20%5baccessed%2023%20July
%202018 [https://perma.cc/S2SW-F676].
119
UNHCR, UNHCR’s Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to
the
Detention
of
Asylum-Seekers,
para.
4
(Feb.
1999),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3c2b3f844.html
[https://perma.cc/XN7QQ4WF].
120
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset, paras. 44, 68 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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and the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of movement of
asylum seekers before the determination of their status,121 rather
than as it was meant to be applied, as prohibiting such restrictions
as a general rule.122 Israel is not the only country to offer this
restrictive interpretation of the section. Other countries detain or
restrict freedom of movement of asylum seekers prior to
determining their status.123
Moreover, even if the Court (mistakenly) interpreted the
Refugee Convention to allow detention, it should have mattered
whether the individuals are economic migrants or refugees. The
purpose of detention of each of these two types of migrants differs
and affects the proportionality of the length of their detention. While
migrant workers may be detained to enable their removal to their
home countries, refugees cannot be refouled to a country where
their life or liberty may be threatened on account of “race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”124 Their detention is not allowed under international law,
by and large, save for reasons of identity verification or due to
security and public order considerations.125
Interestingly, the judicial restraint of the Supreme Court
sometimes signifies the exact opposite of some of the decisions of
the lower courts. The lower Appeals Tribunals expressed on
occasion harsher critique of the representative branches, pointing to
unreasonable delays in the processing of individual asylum
applications, or the barriers to applying for asylum. They granted
to some of these applicants permits to reside in Israel, until the
Minister of Interior decides on their RSD applications.126 The
121 Id. at para. 44 (“Although these sections treat restrictions upon freedom of
movement, according to the accepted interpretation they also apply to the detention
of persons who unlawfully entered the state in order to file an asylum application”).
122
See UNHCR Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards, supra note
119, para. 3 (stating that restrictions should not be automatic, unduly prolonged or
without necessity).
123
See infra Part 4 (regarding the U.S.); see also Pugliese, supra note 91
(regarding Australia); infra Part 4 (regarding residency centers).
124
Refugee Convention, supra note 8, article 33.
125
See Refugee Convention, supra note articles 9, 26, 31; see also
UNHCR, Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of
Asylum-Seekers
and
Alternatives
to
Detention,
24
(2012),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/503489533b8.html
[https://perma.cc/J4PDYJK7].
126
See, e.g., File No. 4447-17 Appeals Tribunal, John Doe v. Ministry of
Interior—Population and Immigration Authority (Feb. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); File 3844-17 Appeals Tribunal, John
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Appeals Tribunals also criticized the State’s sweeping legal position
that rejected the vast majority of applications of Eritrean asylum
seekers. The State determined that fleeing a country to evade army
service, does not fulfill the requirements of the Refugee Convention.
Rejecting the State’s position, the Appeals Tribunals held that
fleeing the army may at times be an act that leads the Eritrean
authorities to attribute to the evaders political opinions that oppose
the regime. They may thus persecute those people on political
grounds, if the State returned them to Eritrea. While institutionally
lower courts might be more inclined to demonstrate judicial
restraint, and are more institutionally dependent, they have, on
occasion, shown a considerable degree of activism in these cases.
They occasionally held the State accountable for its failure to
conduct effective RSD processes in individual cases and even
granted refugee status to an Eritrean.127 But unlike Supreme Court
decisions, these lower court decisions do not have precedential
value—they can be overturned128 —and they do not have the teeth
of a constitutional case.129
The U.S. judicial system is facing similar challenges in the
context of the recent asylum ban. The ban would effectively prevent
the courts from adjudicating asylum requests of those entering the
U.S. in an undocumented manner, i.e., not through designated ports
of entry, and enable the entrants to enjoy protection against removal
at most.130 While the legal challenges against the American asylum
ban focus on its compliance with statutory law,131 this Article
suggests that the ban may infringe international refugee norms as
well, along the lines of some of the secondary arguments made in
these legal challenges. Upholding such a regime will prevent the
Doe & Others v Ministry of Interior—Population and Immigration Authority (Dec.
13, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
127
See, e.g., File No. 1010-14 Appeals Tribunal, John Doe v. Ministry of
Interior–The Population and Immigration Authority (Feb. 15, 2018), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (providing an example of a state being
held accountable for its failure to conduct effective RSD processes).
128
See, e.g., CA 32641-10/18 The State of Israel—The Population and
Immigration Authority v. Joe Doe (2017) (Isr.) (returning the decision in the
Mesegene case to the lower court).
129
Compare with the analysis of the Courts’ rulings on migrant workers’
rights issues. See Ofer Sitbon, The Place of the Courts in Israel and France in the
Formation of the Policy on Migrant Workers, 10 L. & GOV. 273, 290–314 (2007) (in
Hebrew).
130 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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courts from fulfilling their role to bring the representative branches
to accountability.
2.3. Failing to Refer to the Legal Implications of the Duration of
Presence
2.3.1. The Constitutional Law Dimension
In various cases dealing with the constitutional rights of
undocumented entrants, the Court had consistently refrained from
making the length of their presence in the country into a
constitutional consideration with implications on the scope of the
rights they may be entitled to. This is despite the fact that the longer
a person is positioned in a “temporary” state of uncertainty, the
more it negatively affects his or her human dignity.132
The majority of decisions in the detention cases, for example, did
not refer to legal, social or moral consequences, which derive from
the fact that while some of these undocumented entrants have been
in Israel for a short period of time, others were present for over a
decade. Members of the Court were aware of this distinction
between old and new entrants. Justices Amit and Vogelman in
separate concurring opinions suggested that, from a constitutional
perspective, it might be less legitimate to transfer long-term
undocumented entrants to residency centers, because of the greater
disruption to their lives, as compared to new arrivals.133
The cases on immigration detention are not the only cases in
which the majority of the Court refused to derive constitutional
consequences from the duration of a person’s presence in the
132
See, e.g., Pugliese, supra note 91 (examining the negative effects of
Australia’s Temporary Protection Visa regime on the lives of refugees and asylum
seekers); but see Joseph Melnick & Susan Roos, The Myth of Closure, 11 GESTALT
REV. 90–107 (2007) (challenging the notion that a lack of emotional closure forms
the basis of neurosis associated with grief and loss).
133
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset, para. 5 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Amit, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); id. at para. 52 (Vogelman, J., opinion). Both Justice
Amit and Justice Vogelman dissented on a different matter. They held that the
section of the law that allows the authorities to transfer detainees in residency
centers to full detention in regular detention facilities as a disciplinary sanction is
unconstitutional as it arises to the level of a criminal sanction in light of the lengthy
detention period authorized under it.
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country. In a later case regarding the possible detention and
supposedly “voluntary” removal of asylum seekers to third
countries, the Court mentioned the duration of a person’s presence
in Israel under a form of temporary protection, as a personal
consideration, that the State should weigh when considering
removal.134 However, this was not presented as a constitutional
issue, but rather as a humanitarian consideration. In a case
challenging the lack of possibility to naturalize for refugees, the
Court determined that the fact that a person has stayed in Israel
eleven years, out of which he was a recognized refugee for seven
years, does not create a legal obligation on the part of the State to
grant him or her permanent, as opposed to temporary, residency.135
Finally, when considering the policy of not granting asylum seekers
a right to work, the Court determined that the commitment of the
State to refrain from enforcing the prohibition on their employment
“strikes a proper balance in the difficult and sensitive reality.”136 It
did not, yet again, treat the duration of presence as a constitutional
consideration, impacting the right to gainful employment.137

134
See File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals, Zegete v. Minister of the
Interior (Aug. 28, 2017) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
135
See File No. 35344-03-10, Administrative Affairs (Jerusalem), Galan v.
Minister of Interior (Apr. 15, 2012), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.). For an argument that a lengthy stay as a refugee in a country may
give rise to a right for permanent residency and even citizenship. See Livnat, supra
note 10.
136
File No. 6312/10 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Kav Laoved v. the
Government (Jan. 16, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)
(Isr.); see also Yuval Livnat, Refugees, Employers, and “Practical Solutions” in the High
Court of Justice: Responding to HCJ 6312/10 Worker’s Hotline v the Government, 3
MISHPATIM ONLINE 23 (2011) (arguing against the decision as providing insufficient
protection to asylum seekers).
137 Cf. File No. 1708/07 District Court (Tel-Aviv-Jaffa) Amon v. Minister of
Interior (Sept. 25, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
The district court, sitting as an administrative court, decided that a documented
migrant worker who stayed in Israel 17 years with a permit did not acquire a right
to residency in Israel. It further ruled that the legislature did not grant the Minister
of Interior discretion to grant permanent residency to documented migrant workers
simply because of a lengthy stay in Israel. A petition to the Supreme Court led the
Court to convince the migrant to withdraw the petition and request residency based
on marriage in common-law with an Israeli citizen.
File No. 8947/08
Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem), Amon v. The Minister of Interior (July 1, 2010),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). The Court noted, without
expressing an opinion on the merits, that its decision did not prevent the Minister
of Interior from adopting a procedure with regard to future cases of documented
migrant workers who spend many years in Israel.
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Moreover, in all of these decisions, none of the Justices suggested
that the duration of stay impacts the constitutional duties that the
State may owe to these people. The State owes greater constitutional
obligations to those whose presence is tolerated longer, even if they
are not regularized or officially admitted. After all, by not resolving
their legal status earlier, the State contributed to their presence and
the formation of various types of reliance interests in their ability to
continue to develop their lives in the country. The State may have
the least obligations to those who never entered it, while its
obligations to those who reside in it—with or without formal legal
status—expand as time passes.138
Had the Court inferred any constitutional significance from the
duration of stay, it would have escalated tension with the
representative branches. In fact, the policy of the government,
which the Court has upheld in different cases, was one of two
contradictory notions: 1) Migrants, whether documented or
undocumented, should only be allowed to remain in Israel
temporarily, so that they would not be allowed to claim rights on
the basis of being firmly integrated into Israeli society; 2) Migrants
who have remained in Israel for a long period of time, despite
Israel’s policies to prevent such occurrences, cannot expect to be
granted any rights on the basis of their long presence and integration
into Israeli society.139
In the cases on immigration detention, the State preferred that
those who were present in Israel the longest—the first to arrive—
would move to the residency center first to prevent their integration

138
The Court offered these varying obligations of the State towards foreigners
and those residing within its borders as a justification for the Law of Return. “It is
true, members of the Jewish nation were granted a special key to enter (see the Law
of Return-5710–1950), but once a person is lawfully present as a citizen, he enjoys
equal rights with all other household members.” CA 6698/95 Ka’adan v. Israel
Land Auth., 54(1) PD 258, 280-81 (2000) (Isr.); see Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 693 (majority
opinion) (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the
United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law . . .
It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons
inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographical
borders.”). That the length of stay within a country matters is reflected in the
immigration laws of various countries that make the passage of time a prerequisite
for acquiring the status of permanent resident or citizen.
139
Livnat, supra note 10, at 369–76. The policy is different with regard to
migrants who come to Israel under the Law of Return and may immediately
become Israeli citizens. The Law of Return applies to Jews and their immediate
family members.
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into Israeli society.140 This follows a logic that is opposite to the one
for which we are arguing. It should be noted that, since the
detention cases were decided after Israel had already erected a fence
limiting further undocumented entry through its southern border,
almost all of the persons subject to immigration detention or
confinement in the residency center were people who had resided
in Israel for a lengthy period of time.141 Distinguishing between
undocumented people based on the length of their presence would
have, at least, mitigated the infringement of their constitutional
rights.
Treating the undocumented entrants as one indistinguishable
mix migration flow, a group composed of possible refugees as well
as economic migrants, with both newcomers and oldcomers, led to
harsh consequences in terms of their human dignity. This groupbased approach prompted the Court to state that it does not matter
who is placed in residency centers, as long as someone is, to reduce
the burden on Israel’s disempowered neighborhoods. The President
of the Court, Miryam Naor, held in the majority opinion:
I am of the opinion that realizing this purpose does not
require holding any particular infiltrator in the residency
center. It is sufficient that a group of various infiltrators be
held in the residency center. Indeed, it is to be assumed that
when one infiltrator is released from the residency center,
another infiltrator will take his place. I am of the opinion
that this turnover between the infiltrators staying in the
residence center and others from outside realizes the
purpose of the Law. It is sufficient that at any given time,
part of the infiltrator population [ . . . ] is removed from the
urban centers.142
This cannot possibly align with human dignity, which requires
treating persons as an end, rather than a means, to promote broader
social purposes.143 The Court has repeatedly held in other detention
contexts that a person’s liberty cannot be compromised by the
executive branch without criminal proceedings with full due
140
See, e.g., File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v.
Knesset, para. 5 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Amit, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); id. at para. 52 (Vogelman, J., opinion).
141 See id. at para. 2 (Hendel, J., opinion).
142 Id. at para. 100 (Naor, Pres., opinion).
143
See HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Gov’t v. Knesset 61(1) PD 619
(2006) (Isr.).
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process guarantees, unless his individual actions justify detention to
prevent danger to others or to prevent his flight from legal
proceedings.144 A person’s liberty cannot be compromised to serve
other social ends, important as they may be.145
At the same time that the Supreme Court referred to
undocumented entrants en masse, the lower courts referred to them
in light of their individual traits, including their immigration story
and the duration of their presence in the country. This sometimes
led the lower courts to take a braver stance than the Supreme Court.
Such was the case, for example, in the decision of the Appeals
Tribunal to grant temporary residence status to five Sudanese
asylum seekers who had been in Israel for six to ten years and
waiting for a decision on their asylum application for over a year.146
A second set of cases involved persons from Darfur, who waited
four to five years for a RSD decision, and were not included in the
list of 500 Darfurians eligible for temporary residence status on
humanitarian grounds. In one decision, the Court ordered that the
State should grant the asylum seeker temporary residency status
and determine his RSD status within forty-five days.147 In other
decisions, the Court instructed the State to grant the asylum seekers
a temporary residency status, pending their security clearances.148
All in all, the lower courts granted at least eighty-one Darfurians
temporary residence status until the State decides on the merits of
their asylum request.149 In a different form of intervention, the
Appeals Tribunal granted an Eritrean asylum seeker, whose asylum
144
See, e.g., CrimA 7048/97 John Does v. Ministry of Def. 54(1) PD 721, para.
19 (2000) (Isr.) (Barak, Pres., opinion).
145
See id. at para. 17.
146
See File No. 4447/17 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), John Doe v. Ministry of
Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. (Mar. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
147
See File No. 4117/17 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), John Doe v. Ministry of
Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. (Feb. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
148
See e.g., File No. 1893/18 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), M.O.M.A. v.
Ministry of Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. (Mar. 7, 2018), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); File No. 2887/18 Appeals Tribunal
(Jerusalem), N.M.A. v. Ministry of Interior-Population and Immigration Auth.
(Mar. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); File No.
3351/18 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), A.A.A. v. Ministry of Interior-Population
and Immigration Auth. (Mar. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.).
149
See File No. 2887/18 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), N.M.A. v. Ministry of
Interior-Population and Immigration Authority, para. 16 (Mar. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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application was pending for more than five years, a work permit for
a period of three weeks. After this initial period, he would be
granted temporary residency status unless the State rejected his
asylum application. This holding was based on the State’s
unreasonable delay in examining his asylum application.150
These different judicial attitudes might be related to the fact that
the lower tribunals’ decisions are narrower and more case-specific
than those of the Supreme Court. This may explain the lower courts’
willingness to take into account the duration of a person’s presence
in the country or the duration of his waiting for a decision. By doing
so, the lower courts do not create widely applicable precedents.
Another potential explanation may be that the lower courts’
decisions are not as widely publicized. They are also administrative
decisions, which lead to the annulment of administrative decisions,
rather than constitutional decisions that might lead to the
annulment of legislation. As there are no teeth comparable to those
of a constitutional case, or even a generally applicable Supreme
Court case, and since it was possible to appeal these administrative
decisions, they did not trigger the kind of confrontation with the
representative branches that Israeli society has witnessed with
regard to Supreme Court cases dealing with the detention of
undocumented entrants. Moreover, the Supreme Court even
reversed lower courts’ decisions on occasion, preventing asylum
seekers from receiving interim status until their asylum applications
were decided.151 Thus, the Supreme Court was not just exercising
judicial restraint on its own; it was also enforcing such restraint on
the lower courts, possibly for the above-mentioned institutional
reasons.

150
See File No. 2376/18 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), John Doe v. Ministry of
Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. (July 29, 2018), (on file with authors)
(Isr.).
151
See File No. 2317/19 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem) John Doe v. Ministry of
Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. (Apr. 2, 2019), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); see also Merav Ben Zeev & Nimrod Avigal, No Home,
No Law—The Forgotten Story of the Refugees from Darfur, HAMISHPAT ONLINE: HUMAN
RIGHTS
(June
4,
2019)
(Isr.),
http://zola.colman.ac.il/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/89_3benzeev_avigal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VA694ZP]; but see File No. 4331/19 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Adam v. The State
of Israel-Population and Immigration Auth. (July 28, 2019), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (allowing asylum seekers to receive interim
residency as they await the determination of their status by authorities).
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2.3.2. The International Law Dimension
The duration of a stay in a country is not just relevant from a
constitutional point of view but also from the point of view of
international law. Under International Refugee Law, the longer the
presence of a person in a country, and the more substantial his or
her bond with the country, the more rights he or she is entitled to
enjoy.152 While the basic right of protection from refoulement to a
territory, where a person’s “life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion,” 153 is granted to anyone who is
subject to the State’s jurisdiction and alleges to be a refugee (until
decided otherwise),154 the rights to freedom of movement,
engagement in self-employment and protection against expulsion
apply to anyone who is “lawfully present.”155
The interpretation of the term “lawful presence” and the rights
that derive from this status are one of the instances in which a
significant gap exists between states’ practices and international
human rights law.156 Many countries do not grant rights to refugees
until they affirm that these people are entitled to such treatment,
despite the mere declarative nature of determining refugee status.157
Many states are further unwilling to grant the protection against
expulsion, until they grant refugees the right to remain in the
country indefinitely.158 Some states even treat refugees, who enter
them in a documented manner, as not “lawfully present” until
officially recognized as refugees.159 These states’ practices do not
See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 154–92.
Refugee Convention, supra note 8, art. 33(1).
154
See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 159–60.
155
See Refugee Convention, supra note 8, arts. 18, 26, 32. At a higher level of
attachment to the country, that of “lawful stay,” the person may be entitled to
additional rights, including wage-earning employment, practice of profession,
freedom of association, and travel documentation, among others. See Refugee
Convention, supra note 8, arts. 15, 17, 19, 28.
156
See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 173–77; see also GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL &
JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 524–25 (3d ed. 2007).
157
See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 158–59; see also GOODWIN-GILL &
MCADAM, supra note 156, at 524–25.
158
See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 173 n.97.
159
See, e.g., HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 175–77 (describing a British case in
which the Court held that a person who was temporarily admitted was not lawfully
present). By “documented entry,” we mean that the entry was in accordance with
the law governing the entry to the country—typically through an official border
152
153
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accord with the Refugee Convention. They collapse the distinction
between “lawful presence” and “lawful stay” upheld in the Refugee
Convention. Lawful stay grants more Convention rights to the
refugees.160 We join James Hathaway’s position in arguing that
“lawful presence” should be interpreted to cover not just those
whose entrance was documented, but also those who are
undergoing a RSD process (after submitting their application and
complying with the formalities necessary to that end), or are
protected under temporary protection regimes. It covers people
who present a form of authorization that falls significantly short of
an ongoing permission to remain in a country.161 The passage of
reasonable time leads to the acquisition of rights, when the state
neither processes asylum applications nor expels, since it expresses
the implicit acquiescence of the state in the presence of the person
and his or her prima facie entitlement to refugee rights. He or she
becomes lawfully present in the state. This interpretation may find
some support in discussions held during the drafting of the Refugee
Convention.162
Such an interpretation is supported by the Celepli v. Sweden case
from 1991.163 In this case, it was established that a rejected asylum
checkpoint—while carrying identifying and valid travel documents and entry
permits, where applicable.
160
At the higher level of attachment to the country, that of “lawful stay,” the
person may be entitled to additional rights, including wage-earning employment,
practice of profession, freedom of association, and travel documentation, among
others. See Refugee Convention, supra note 8, arts. 15, 17, 19, 28.
161
HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 180–82.
162
See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 175, 659–67. Compare U.N. ESCOR, 1st
Sess., 15th mtg. ¶ 109, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.15 (Feb. 6, 1950),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/40aa1d5f2.html
[https://perma.cc/XXS2Q4FQ] (recording that the French representative Mr. Rain has mentioned that, “any
person in possession of a residence permit was in a regular position. In fact, the
same was true of a person who was not yet in possession of a residence permit but
who had applied for it and had the receipt for that application. Only those persons
who had not applied, or whose application had been refused, were in an irregular
position.”) with id. ¶ 108 (recording that the U.S. representative Mr. Henkin has
recognized that “persons subjected to these restrictions [on movement but regularly
admitted to the country] should nevertheless be considered, for purposes of the
future convention, to have been regularly admitted.”).
163
A 1991 case, Celepli v. Sweden, may support a broad interpretation of the
term “lawful presence.” Sweden granted Celepli, a Turkish citizen of Kurdish
origin, a right to stay in the country, even though it denied him refugee status.
Sweden later suspected that Celepli was involved in terrorism and issued an order
for his expulsion. It was never executed for fear of Celepli’s persecution if Sweden
were to return him to Turkey. However, this order imposed severe limitations on
his movement. Celepli argued in front of the Human Rights Committee that
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seeker, whom Sweden did not remove on humanitarian grounds, is
“lawfully present” for the purposes of the ICCPR. Thus, a similar
argument may be made in the context of the Refugee Convention
regarding persons whose asylum applications have not yet been
determined.164 Lawful presence should only terminate if and when
the state makes a final determination (after all appellate processes
have been exhausted), to either not recognize a person as a refugee
or revoke refugee protection (in accordance with Article 1(C) of the
Refugee Convention in a particular case).165
Even if this interpretation of the term “lawful presence” is
rejected, at the very least, countries in which RSD processes are not
fully functioning—whether it is because they are suspended for a
certain period or with respect to a certain group of asylum seekers
or because they are not fairly administered—must respect the rights
of all asylum seekers as though they are, in fact, lawfully present
refugees. Put differently, choosing not to conduct fair and effective
refugee status verification processes does not authorize

Sweden violated his human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), including the right to liberty of movement enjoyed by
“[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State.” The United Nations Human
Rights Committee found that Sweden did not violate Celepli’s rights. U.N. Human
Rights Comm., Celepli v. Sweden, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/456/1991, ¶ 10 (July
18,
1994),
https://www.refworld.org/cases,HRC,51b6e7ad4.html
[https://perma.cc/7NE9-3MDF]. “The Committee is of the view that, following
the expulsion order, the author was lawfully in the territory of Sweden, for
purposes of article 12, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, only under the restrictions
placed upon him by the State party [as the State argued].” Id. ¶ 9.2.
164
See Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka 2003 (1) All SA 21 (SCA) para.
37 (S. Afr.) (holding that, while South Africa may prohibit employment and study
during the first 180 days after it issued a permit to sojourn temporarily pending the
result of an asylum request, there might be individual cases in which the
application of such a prohibition would be unconstitutional).
165
See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 185–86; see also Rajendran v. Minister for
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1998] 166 ALR 619 (Austl.) (holding that a
person who entered Australia with a visa and enjoys a bridging visa will cease to
be both lawfully present and able to invoke Article 32 of the Refugee Convention
once his application for refugee status is rejected); C.I. v. Minister of Justice Equal.
&
Law
Reform
[2015]
IECA
192,
paras.
35,
40–44
(Ir.),
http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/0/0D275058CF2AFFD080257EC1004E1A01
[https://perma.cc/W9BP-JG8J] (citing Nnyanzi v. U.K., 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2008)
and Bensaid v. U.K., 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 (2001)) (holding that, after an asylum
application was rejected, “it would require wholly exceptional circumstances to
engage the operation of Article 8 in relation to a proposal to deport persons who
have never had permission to reside in the State (other than being permitted to
remain pending determination of an asylum application)” because the deportee’s
right to remain in the country was always precarious).
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governments to withhold refugee rights.166 Any other interpretation
of the term “lawful presence” would allow refugees to be held
hostage because of states’ decisions to refrain from fairly and
adequately processing asylum applications.
More concretely, if the undocumented entrants in Israel are
lawfully present—as we would argue, until the State officially
decides to deny them asylum in a fair process and on an individual
basis—then this consideration must affect not only their freedom of
movement but also their protection from expulsion. Both of these
rights are granted to persons who are lawfully present in a country.
Protection from expulsion is much broader than protection from
refoulement. It limits states’ ability to expel a refugee anywhere (even
to other places where they may find safety), with exceptions that are
limited to national security and public order grounds. Procedurally,
expulsion requires due process before a competent senior
authority.167 Prohibiting the expulsion of persons whose asylum
applications were not fairly and timely processed is a matter of basic
fairness.168 Different courts around the world have held, based on
their obligations under domestic law as well as international
law,that asylum seekers may remain in the country and cannot be
expelled, pending the results of their applications for protection.169
In the context of transfer agreements between the host country
and third countries, this means that the ability to expel pursuant to
third country agreements complies with international law only if it
occurs before lawful presence is established (at which point Article
32 governs and narrows the ability to expel). States may only expel
See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 184–85.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 8, at §§ 32–33 (detailing the
requirements for expulsion and the prohibition of refoulment); HATHAWAY, supra
note 100, at 669–73 (explaining that exclusion requires legal due process, though
not necessarily judicial review).
168 See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 667.
169
For example, see, e.g., Arse v. Minister of Home Affairs 2010 (7) BCLR 640
(SCA) (S. Afr.), holding the detention of the applicant unlawful because, under
domestic South African law, notwithstanding any law to the contrary: no
proceedings may be instituted or continued against any person in respect of his or
her unlawful entry into or presence in the country if that person has applied for
asylum . . . until a decision has been made on his or her application and that person
has had an opportunity to exhaust his or her rights or [sic] review or appeal. See
also Case C-534/11, Arslan v. Czech, 2013 E.C.R. (May 30, 2013) (holding that if a
person applied for asylum after he was detained and ordered to be removed, then
the state must determine his application status before removal is possible. The state
may continue to detain him, if authorized under national law, when necessary to
prevent his evasion of removal proceedings.).
166
167
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a refugee claimant to a safe third country (subject to its obligation to
non-refoulement directly or indirectly) during the early stages of the
refugee claimant’s arrival in its territory—before the person applies
for recognition as a refugee or complies with the formalities of the
RSD.170
To conclude, the Court has courageously protected the
constitutional rights of undocumented entrants, but it missed the
opportunity to bring the representative branches to accountability
with regard to the most important issues on their agenda. It did not
require the State to decide the refugee status of these people in a
timely manner, nor did it accord the entrants, on an interim basis,
rights accruing to them as a result of a lengthy presence in the
country.
3. A HIGH STAKES CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
At the same time, the Court also employed various other
strategies to reduce the conflict with the other branches of
government. With each invalidation of immigration detention, the
Court encountered increasing criticism that questioned the
legitimacy of its authority to strike down primary legislation as
unconstitutional, especially in the immigration context.171 The
constitutional dialogue turned into a constitutional struggle. As an
act of institutional self-defense, the Court applied constitutional
avoidance, sectioning of laws, and babysitting and delaying
techniques in an attempt to downplay its own judicial activism.
3.1. Using Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine
Over the course of the litigation on immigration detention, the
legislature revised the three-year detention period (invalidated in
Adam) to a one-year detention scheme (invalidated in Eitan) and
then revised it again to a three-month period (upheld in Desta).172
Although the Court required the legislature to explicitly make the
See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 663–64.
See infra Part 1.
172
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset, para. 52 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
170
171

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/3

2019]

African Undocumented Entrants in Israel

85

viability of removal a precondition for the constitutionality of
detention in the Eitan case,173 the legislature did not comply. It only
shortened the detention period from one year to three months.174
Rather than invalidating this three-month detention scheme, the
Court upheld it in Desta by reading an implicit link between
detention authority and the possibility of removal into the statute,
determining that if the executive branch finds that it cannot remove
a person, then it must release that person immediately. The Court
preferred to “save” the statute from invalidity through this
interpretation since this interpretation was a lesser intervention in
the legislative function.175
However, the constitutional avoidance doctrine, which instructs
courts to prefer an interpretation that does not lead to a finding of
unconstitutionality, only applies when such an interpretation does
not rewrite the statute.176 It is questionable whether the Court’s
interpretation in Desta abused the legislative language and intent.
This questionability is revealed when considering the Court’s
treatment of stare decisis in the case at hand. The Israeli Supreme
Court does not typically treat stare decisis as a substantial constraint
on its decisions.177
Nonetheless, Desta stands out, even against this background,
since the Court deviated from its own prior ruling within a year. In
the Eitan decision, the Court held that it may not read an implied
condition, that the authority to detain is contingent on the possibility
of removal, into the immigration detention statute. The Court thus
required the legislature to make this condition explicit. One year
later, after the legislature rejected this requirement, the Court read
this condition into the statute anyway, through interpretation, in the
Desta case. Of course, one may accept the Court’s explanation that
173
See File No. 7385/13, 8425/13 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Eitan—
Israeli Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli Government, para. 199 (Sept. 22,
2014) (Vogelman, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)
(Isr.).
174
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset, para. 47 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
175
Id. at para. 48 (Naor, Pres., opinion).
176
See, e.g., File No. 7385/13, 8425/13 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem),
Eitan—Israeli Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli Government (Sept. 22, 2014),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); see Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. at 836, 843.
177
See AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 250–52 (Yadin Kaufmann trans.,
1989) (arguing in favor of the “right decision,” even at the price of stability and stare
decisis).
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it is easier to read this condition into the statute when the legislature
shortened the immigration detention period from one year to three
months.178 But, on the other hand, the Desta Court did not heavily
weigh this explanation against the counter-argument: that not only
had the legislature shortened the immigration detention period, but
it had also considered whether to make an explicit link between
detention authority and the possibility of removal and decided
otherwise. Stare decisis is intended to provide stability to the legal
landscape, protect the public’s reliance and expectation interests,
but no less, strengthen the legitimacy of the judicial decision-making
authority. Yet, presumably for its own institutional preservation,
the Court deviates from its own general reasoning on stare decisis.
When constitutional avoidance through interpretation amounts
to rewriting a statute, the infringement on the legislative power is
greater than a finding of unconstitutionality. The Court’s decision
may materially affect the remedies of the parties to the case. If the
Court interprets the statute in a robust way that aligns with the
petitioners’ rights, then the petitioners receive their remedies
immediately. If, on the other hand, the Court finds such an
interpretation impossible and declares the statute inoperative, then
the petitioners might have to wait for the legislature to act in order
to address their grievances.179
The Court’s decision might hinder the legislature’s ability to
respond to the judicial ruling. When a court declares a statute
inoperative, the void might spur the legislature to gather the
necessary majorities to draft a different legislative scheme. But, the
forces of inertia and “veto-gates” operate differently when a
statutory arrangement remains intact and the legislature merely
needs to amend the statute in response to a judicial interpretation.180
No less important, when a court invalidates a statute, its decision
resonates throughout the political arena and is thoroughly
discussed. Thus, the courts carefully analyze whether to embark on
such a costly course of action or not. If they issue too many judicial
invalidations, then structural changes to the courts’ jurisdiction and
power may result. In contrast, no similar constraints operate to
restrain the courts from adopting robust interpretation of statutes.
178
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset paras. 48 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
179
See Weill, Constitutional Statutes, supra note 113, at 79.
180
See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 11–12, 22–
23 (1982).
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Frustrating the legislative will through interpretation is always a
matter of judgment.
It is true that, during the judicial proceedings in Desta, the State’s
attorneys suggested that the Court adopt an interpretation that
would render striking down the law for a third time unnecessary.181
But, these legal representatives are a part of the executive branch,
and their afterthoughts in front of the Court do not replace an
accurate account of the legislative language and will when enacting
the statute.
3.2. Sectioning to Reduce the Appearances of Judicial Activism
The Court held that it had only invalidated the immigration
detention laws twice,182 though in all three cases—Adam, Eitan and
Desta—the result was the invalidation of the laws or parts thereof.183
One possible explanation of this miscount could be that, within the
three cycles of litigation, the Court struck down the section
providing for prolonged immigration detention twice and struck
down the confinement to the residency centers twice. The Court
counts the third time that it struck down the detention statute as a
second instance of nullifying the law because it separates the
different sections that it struck down. 184
The sectioning of the law is far from convincing since the
different sections of the law do not stand independently of each
other. The residency center was created in response to the Adam
decision, as a complementary means of confinement, as the
legislature had reduced the detention period to one year. Clearly,
the legislature linked the decrease in the detention period to the
possibility of confinement in residency centers, and the Court failed
to acknowledge this.
This façade enabled the Court to avoid explicit dealing with the
heavy implications of its decisions: the fact that the legislature was
violating constitutional and international law norms three times,
181
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset, para. 46 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
182
Id. at paras. 52–4.
183 See supra Part I.
184
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset, paras. 52–4 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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within a two-year period, with regard to the same group of people,
and on the same issue.
3.3. Delaying Decisions and Babysitting Techniques
The Court decided the cases on immigration detention rather
quickly, within a few months, in a manner befitting cases that deal
with the right to liberty. In other cases involving the rights of
undocumented entrants, the Court took several years to reach a
decision. In many of these other cases, the Court held several
hearings and attempted to see if the passage of time would resolve
the issue or if the parties would reach an agreement in the shadow
of legal proceedings. For example, the Court took two years to
decide whether the State may use the old Infiltration Law to detain
undocumented entrants from Sudan, even though the statute did
not provide for judicial review.185 During those years, the Court
pressured the State to introduce some civil mechanisms of judicial
review into the old law but eventually codified a compromise under
which the government committed to review immigration detention
under the Law of Entry into Israel.186
The judicial tactics of delay and babysitting were also manifest
when the Israeli Army “pushed back” undocumented entrants who
were attempting to enter Israel through its border with Egypt. The
Army either prevented their entry or coordinated their return to
Egypt within a short interval.187 It took the Court nearly four years
to deliver a decision on this policy. During those years, the Court
pressured the government to introduce improved procedural
safeguards to the pushback mechanism instead of deciding whether
the pushbacks were permissible under international and
constitutional law. These safeguards included the need to guarantee
the safe return of these people and enable them to request asylum.188
The Court ultimately rejected the petition as “theoretical” in 2011,189
when the Israeli Army admitted to its inability to conduct
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
See HCJ 3208/06 4 Anonymous Parties v. The Head of the Operations
Division in the Israeli Defense Forces (Oct. 7, 2008) (Isr.).
187
See File No. 7302/07 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Hotline for
Refugees and Migrants v. Minister of Def., para. 1 (July 7, 2011), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
188
See id. at paras. 5–11.
189
Id. at para. 12.
185
186
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coordinated pushbacks with Egypt after the overturn of the
regime.190 After delaying the decision for so long, the Court found
it sufficient to say that it assumes “that if and when the policy of
returns to Egypt is renewed . . . it would be implemented in
accordance with acceptable standards of international law, and with
adequate guarantees to insure in a high level of certainty the safety
of those returned.”191 The Court refrained from providing any
further guidance to the State on which legal constraints restrict its
ability to conduct such pushbacks.
A third example may be found with regard to the right to access
food when at the residency center. When the State prohibited
undocumented entrants from bringing food into the residency
centers and prevented self-cooking in them, the Court took nearly
two and a half years to reach a decision. While the petition was
pending, the Court attempted to persuade the government to
concede.192 The petitioners submitted the petition in the midst of the
religious fast of Ramadan and argued that they lacked access to food
items necessary for the observance of the religious holiday.
Nonetheless, the Court delayed a decision on the merits.
A fourth, and the most important, example has to do with
principled petitions challenging the State’s failure to conduct fair
and effective RSDs for Sudanese asylum-seekers’ applications.193
These petitions have been pending before the High Court of Justice
for about two years to date, as the Court has preferred to grant
deference to the State to come up with solutions. The State, on the
other hand, has continued to submit occasional updates to the
Court, initially suggesting that a policy on these asylum applications
is about to be formed and applied194 and then finally suggesting that
See id. at paras. 9–11.
Id. at para. 12.
192
See File No. 4581/15 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Ismail v.
Comptroller of Prisons (Nov. 19, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.). The Court accepted the petition in part and allowed the residents
to bring ready-made food to their rooms, even though it denied the residents’
request to cook for themselves.
193
See HCJ 1031/18 Moshir v. Minister of Interior (Feb. 5, 2018) (Isr.),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dl_8biOqtgwKX11bFzMzN2wJprZvyRMt/vie
w [https://perma.cc/E43N-S74J]; HCJ 4630/17 & 7552/17 Tagal v. Prime Minister
of Isr. (June 7, 2017) (Isr.).
194
See, e.g., HCJ 4630/17 & 7552/17 Tagal v. Prime Minister of Isr. (Oct. 29,
2018),
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts
%5C17%5C300%5C046%5Cv36&fileName=17046300.V36&type=4
[https://perma.cc/6PRE-66SF].
190
191
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RSD reviews for Sudanese asylum-seekers should be halted in light
of the political changes in Sudan.195 Throughout this period, the
Court has acted as a “babysitter,” allowing the State to drag its feet
and granting a number of extensions. The Court has been granting
these extensions, even though its decision to refrain from
acknowledging that at least some of the Sudanese asylum-seekers
meet the definition of “refugees” has had immediate and harsh
consequences for them.196
This growing tendency of the Israeli Supreme Court to serve as
a “babysitter,” guiding the authorities to arrive at a solution that the
Court perceives to be palatable, is not subject-specific.197 The Court
tends to “babysit:” (1) in situations in which rendering a decision,
rather than reaching a compromise, would lead to results that are
less “just”; (2) in cases that are politically sensitive, in an effort to
avoid a conflict with the other branches of government; and (3) in
complicated matters, in an attempt to reduce the Court’s intense
workload and avoid the need to write lengthy decisions.198 In the
context of the various decisions on the rights of undocumented
entrants, this strategy has led to prolonged infringements on the
human and constitutional rights of these individuals.
In conclusion, the Court’s use of constitutional avoidance,
sectioning of the law, and delay and babysitting techniques have all
contributed to the failure of the Court to bring the political branches
to account in refugee matters.
4. STRATEGIC USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW
The Israeli Supreme Court has relied heavily on comparative
law in its various decisions on undocumented entrants’ rights. It has
seemingly taken for granted that it was legitimate to use
comparative law as part of its reasoning. It further assumed that this
reliance enhanced the legitimacy of its decisions in the eyes of both
Israelis and the international community.199 At times, the Court has
195
See, e.g., HCJ 4630/17 & 7552/17 Tagal v. Prime Minister of Isr. (July 9,
2019) (Isr.).
196 Supra introduction.
197
Ariel Bendor & Tal Sela, Judicial Discretion: The Third Era, 46 MISHPATIM 605,
639–41 (2018) (Isr.).
198
Id.
199
There is no equivalent debate to the one taking place in the U.S. Supreme
Court regarding the question whether such reliance on comparative law is at all
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used comparative law to portray Israel as a state that shoulders its
part in the global refugee crisis and faces challenges similar to those
encountered by other countries.200 At other times, the Court
presented the Israeli struggle with undocumented entry as unique,
either because of its geographical circumstances,201 or because of
political, economic and demographic considerations.202 But there
were shortcomings to the use of comparative constitutional law,
since distinguishing factors were not given adequate weight.
4.1. Employing Strategic Comparisons
The global tendency to refer to comparative law and states’
practices in the context of immigration and refugee law is welldocumented.203 Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs argue that often
the judicial reliance on comparative law is strategic, aiming to
achieve inter-judicial cooperation in order to “stand up to the
domestic political process without incurring the ‘costs’ of increasing
the numbers of refugees.”204 Benvenisti argues that courts refer to
comparative legal sources in order “either to bolster their respective
domestic political processes or to withstand what they view as a
coordinated intergovernmental assault on their independence.”205
This can explain the Israeli Court’s use of comparative law in the
legitimate. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (questioning whether the
Court’s reliance on comparative law is legitimate).
200
See, e.g., File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset, para. 2 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (“In the Adam case and the Eitan case, we noted that
these challenges are not unique to Israel, and that there has been a constant rise in
the number of men and women wandering outside their countries for various
reasons over the last decades.”); id. (Vogelman, J., opinion) (“Like other countries,
Israel is also required to contend with the global refugee and migrant crises that is
the worst since the Second World War.”).
201
See, e.g., id. para 1 (Vogelman, J., opinion) (noting that Israel is the only
Western country with a continental border to Africa).
202
See File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals, Zegete v. Minister of the
Interior, para. A (Aug. 28, 2017) (Rubinstein, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (discussing Israel’s unique security and immigration
challenges).
203
See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of
Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241 (2008).
204
EYAL BENVENISTI & GEORGE W. DOWNS, BETWEEN FRAGMENTATION AND
DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 136 (2017).
205
Benvenisti, supra note 203, at 270.
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context of undocumented entrants as well. The Court has
presumably resorted to comparative law to increase its legitimacy in
light of the institutional de-legitimation it has endured. The
representative branches harshly criticized the Court as protecting
the rights of undocumented entrants and frustrating the will of both
the legislature and government.
The Court conducted comprehensive reviews of comparative
law to both uphold and strike down governmental policies towards
undocumented entrants. For example, in the Desta case, the Court
used comparative law for both purposes. It determined that a three
months detention period was constitutional, because it aligned with
comparative practice.206 It further held, based on comparative
practice, that a twenty-month mandatory residence stay in a
designated center was unconstitutional.207 In Zegete, the Court
referred to comparative law to uphold third country agreements,
which allow supposedly “voluntary” removals of undocumented
entrants to third countries.208
The Court thus used comparative law as an “immunization
device” that foresees possible criticisms and attempts to
preemptively respond to them. These criticisms may come from
both those who believe the Court was overtly activist (critique from
the “right” or the authorities) as well as from those who believe it
was insufficiently protective of rights (critique from the “left” or the
undocumented entrants’ civil society organizations).

206
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset, para. 55 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion) Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (“A maximum period of three months does not,
therefore, deviate from what is acceptable in most countries in which the purpose
of detention is similar to the declared purpose in the matter before us.”).
207
See id. para 101 (noting that “the lengthy period established by the Law has
no parallel in comparative law”).
208
See e.g. File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem), Zegete v.
Minister of the Interior, paras. 30, 33, 37, 39–40, 45 (Aug. 28, 2017) (Naor, Pres.,
opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (allowing only
“voluntary” removals, as per the agreements themselves. Thus, the Court did not
allow holding persons in detention until they agree to be removed to the third
counties).
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4.2. Comparing the Incomparable: 1. Immigration Detention
The Supreme Court reached its conclusion regarding the
unconstitutionality of the detention period in all three cases based
inter alia on the U.S. Supreme Court case, Zadvydas v Davis.209
Kestutis Zadvydas and Kim Ho Ma had both entered the U.S. in
a documented manner as children, at the age of 7 and 8. Zadvydas
held no additional citizenship. As a result of criminal activity, the
INS decided to deport each of them, but no country agreed to accept
them. Ma and Zayydas spent three and seven years, respectively, in
detention centers before their cases reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
When their hearings occurred, Zadvydas had resided for thirtyseven years and Ma for sixteen years in the U.S.210
The similarities between the Zadvydas and Desta cases are few
and far between. In both contexts, the courts were dealing with
immigration detention. In both, the courts expressed commitment
to the notion that states should ultimately refrain from detaining a
person who is not deportable. In both, the courts shared a
commitment to the constitutional avoidance canon, and preferred to
“save” a statute from unconstitutionality through interpretation
rather than resort to invalidity.
However, the differences outweigh the similarities. In terms of
the factual differences, the petitioners in Zadvydas were resident
aliens who were convicted felons with final orders for their
deportation. In the Israeli cases, however, the persons at hand
entered Israel in an undocumented manner and did not acquire the
status of resident, yet except for a handful of persons, the
overwhelming majority of them did not commit crimes and posed
no danger to society. The State did not decide on their refugee status
and did not issue an order for their removal. Each of these
differences could and should affect in a substantial way the
constitutionality of their respective detention.
The normative holdings of the two cases are starkly different as
well. Under Zadvydas, during a removal period of ninety days
provided in the statute, the INS may hold a person in detention,
regardless of the person’s deportability. Beyond the ninety days, the
statute providing for detention should be read to avoid
unconstitutionality, as limited to a judicially-constructed
209
210

See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
See id. at 684–86.
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“reasonable” detention period of six months. Only after six months
of detention, a person may provide good reasons to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, and then the government may rebut with
evidence.211 However, in Desta, the Israeli Supreme Court did not
permit even one day of detention, if the person cannot be deported.
Furthermore, in Zadvysas, the Court emphasized that its reading
into the statute to avoid unconstitutionality was made possible only
because Congress did not explicitly authorize unlimited
immigration detention.212 But, in Desta, though the Court required
the legislature to make an explicit connection between detention and
removal in its previous decisions, the legislature opted otherwise.
Nonetheless, the Court read the requirement into the statute. In
addition, the U.S. Supreme Court in Zadvydas explicitly limited the
scope of its ruling to admitted persons.213 Israeli law does not use a
similar distinction between admissible and non-admissible persons.
Nevertheless, the Israeli Court relied on Zadvydas in Desta, which
dealt with undocumented entrants, some of whom might (at least
temporarily) be initially classified as inadmissible to the U.S.
This interpretation of Zadvydas is reinforced by the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision of March 2018 in Jennings v Rodriguez.214 In Jennings,
the Court held as a matter of statutory interpretation, without
examining the constitutionality of the statute, that the INS is
statutorily authorized to hold some types of undocumented entrants
in detention without a bond hearing for as long as it takes it to reach
a decision on the merits of their defensive asylum application.215
The Court explicitly rejected the argument that asylum seekers may
be released once they submitted their asylum applications.216
There are some similarities, between the Jennings and the Desta
cases, which are worth fleshing out. Rodriguez was a permanent
resident of the U.S., convicted of a drug offense with a pending
removal order. He argued that he was entitled for a bond hearing
as his removal order was challenged in court.217 In a similar
See id. at 701.
See id. at 689.
213
See id. at 682.
214
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
215
The affirmative asylum process is for individuals who are not in removal
proceedings and the defensive asylum process is for individuals who are in removal
proceedings.
216
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 846 (2018).
217
See id. at 838.
211
212
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situation with him were persons who raised a credible claim for
defensive asylum applications,218 whose circumstances were similar
to those of the detainees in the Israeli Desta case.219
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Jennings adopted
an interpretation of the statute that granted an implied right to
periodic bond hearings every six months, to avoid
unconstitutionality.220 The Supreme Court, in a majority decision,
held that such an interpretation was contradictory to the plain
language of the statute.221 The Court held that the Zadvydas ruling
did not extend as far as requiring bond hearings in this type of
immigration detention, primarily since the statute at hand used the
words “shall,” rather than “may,” be detained.222 The Zadvydas
reading-in of a limited detention period of six months cannot be
applied since Congress expressly authorized detention until final
decision, with no bond hearings, in these particular
circumstances.223
The Desta case also dealt with circumstances—in which the
Knesset clearly intended to authorize prolonged immigration
detention even when deportation was unavailable—which made the
reading-in as odd as that conducted by the Ninth Circuit. The Court
in Desta presumably utilized constitutional avoidance due to
“institutional survival” considerations, whereas in Jennings case, the
Court refrained from using this approach, remanding the case and
possibly triggering a constitutional analysis of the question. It
should, however, be noted that the Jennings decision does not detract
from the principle laid out in Zadvydas (and shared by Desta), which
ties the ability to detain with deportability.
The implications of the compilation of the two U.S. Supreme
Court cases are that detention is limited in time after a final removal
order (Zadvydas), but possibly prolonged pending an individualized
See id. at 859.
The Israeli asylum system does not distinguish between affirmative and
defensive asylum applications. In most cases involving Eritreans and Sudanese,
however, it was clear that removal was not possible, even without RSD, due to
temporary group protection from deportation.
220
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018).
221
See id. at 857–58.
222
Id. at 846–50, 862–65.
223
See id. at 859. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress did not explicitly
authorize prolonged detention without bond hearings. Rather, it did not foresee
that prolonged detention would occur. Had Congress expected prolonged
detention, it would have inserted a requirement for periodic bond hearings. Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined his dissent).
218
219
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determination whether to remove a person at all (Jennings). This
“anomalous”224 result did not escape Justice Breyer, who exclaimed
in a minority opinion: “Those whose removal is legally or factually
questionable could be imprisoned indefinitely while the matter is
being decided. Those whose removal is not questionable (for they
are under a final removal order) could be further imprisoned for no
more than six months.”225 Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in
Zadvydas, expressed similar frustrations in the opposite direction, as
a reason why to indefinitely detain deportable aliens.226 The Desta
case is located on a somewhat different plane, since it instructs to
refrain from detaining persons, who are not candidates for removal
(because of the temporary group protection afforded to them), even
before there is a final individualized decision regarding their
removal.
The different circumstances could account, together with the
political and institutional differences,227 to the different outcomes of
the three cases. In the circumstances of Jennings, the State has every
interest to examine the pending applications with due efficiency.
The statute thus assumed that asylum proceedings (not including
appeal) ordinarily end within six months.228 By doing so, the state
can cut down its own expenditures on immigration detention, as
well as the risk to be found violating prohibitions of the Refugee
Convention on limiting the freedom of movement of refugees and
criminalizing their undocumented entry. The risk of prolonged
detention seems thus smaller, but it had nonetheless materialized,
with some asylum seekers held in detention for more than two
years.229 In this sense, it may very well be that the lower court was
more protective of rights, just like the lower courts in Israel.
Id. at 859 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 874.
226
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 702 (2001).
227
A plausible interpretation of these conflicting results is the different
composition of the U.S. Supreme Court. When the Court decided Zadvydas, in 2001,
it was easier for Justice Breyer to persuade his colleagues to join his relative liberal
interpretation. In 2018, Justice Breyer found himself in the minority of a Court
composed of eight Justices (Justice Kagan took no part in the decision of Jennings).
Another explanation may be that the Court decided Zadvydas before September 11,
2001.
228
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 859 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
229
See id. at 860 (“The classes before us consist of people who were detained
for at least six months and on average one year . . . The record shows that the
Government detained some asylum seekers for 831 days (nearly 2.5 years) . . . Twothirds of the asylum seekers [detained] eventually received asylum.”).
224
225
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The self-interest of the state in expeditious proceedings may not
be assumed both in the Zadvydas and Israeli immigration detention
circumstances. In the absence of possibilities to execute a removal
order, as in Zadvydas, states may prefer enduring the costs of
immigration detention to releasing a person to society, whom they
decided to remove. This is especially true on a strategic level, since
a state may fear that if other states knew that their refusal to accept
deportees will lead to their release within it, this will incentivize
other states to refuse to accept them. In his dissenting opinion in
Zadvydas, Justice Kennedy expressed a similar concern.230 In the
Israeli immigration detention cases the state had no realistic option
to remove the undocumented entrants, nor did it want to grant them
refugee status, as discussed above.231 The detention period thus had
no foreseeable expeditious end. The State had further expressed its
interest to exclude the undocumented entrants and deter future
entries despite the high costs of detention. However, in the Desta
line of cases, unlike in Zadvydas, the State ran the risk of violating
the Refugee Convention, by detaining possible refugees for their
undocumented entry.232 It is precisely for this reason that the
Court’s repeated intervention was so important, and why its failure
to prompt an expeditious individual RSD determination was so
unfortunate.
The comparison between the Desta case and the Jennings and
Zadvydas cases indicates that the differences between the cases are
of such significance that it is clear that although the Israeli Supreme
Court reached the right result in Desta, it definitely should not have
relied on Zadvydas to legitimize its decision.
4.3. Comparing the Incomparable: 2. Residency Centers
In the Desta case, the Court also relied on comparative law to
evaluate the proportionality of the limitations placed on the freedom
of movement of undocumented entrants by placing them in a
230
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 711 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“The result of the Court’s rule is that, by refusing to accept repatriation of their
own nationals, other countries can effect the release of these individuals back into
the American community.”).
231
See supra Part 2.
232 Cf. File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The
Knesset (Aug. 11, 2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.),
with Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702.
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residency center.233 The Court examined different policies of
governments around the world toward asylum seekers,
demonstrating that the use of residency centers was widespread and
served the purpose of preventing the “mass influx,” as the Court put
it, of cities.234 “‘Mass influx’ is not only measured quantitatively, but
also relatively, inter alia, giving consideration to the state’s
resources, and specifically its asylum system and its capabilities.”235
President Naor wrote:
The purpose of preventing settling in the urban centers—
which concerns easing the burden upon the urban center in
which there is a significant concentration of aliens—. . .
accords with the rules of international law. The interest in
preventing the concentration of asylum seekers in certain
cities stood at the base of various measures that restrict the
freedom of movement of asylum seekers in Norway,
Switzerland, Germany, and Kenya.236
The Court further relied on the European Union’s directive that
allows asylum seekers to be assigned to areas within the territory in
which they enjoy freedom of movement.237
The Court found, however, that while the purpose of the
residency center was “proper,” the twenty-month mandatory stay
in it did not pass the proportionality stricto sensu test (balancing
harm resulting from infringement of rights and benefits derived
thereof for the public interest): “The lengthy period established by
the Law has no parallel in comparative law.”238 Typically, living in
the residency centers is voluntary and intended to provide social
benefits in comparative practice,239 but even when the stay is
233
At the time of the Desta decision, Israel placed 1,950 undocumented
migrants in the residency center. 76% were Sudanese and the rest Eritreans. Of
them, 1,521 submitted requests for asylum. Half of the submissions occurred while
at the residency center. The maximum period of stay in the center was 14 months.
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset, para.
55 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.) (discussing the residency patterns and applications for asylum of the
Holot residency center).
234
Id. para. 71.
235
Id. para. 73.
236
Id. para. 69.
237
See id. para. 70 (citing Council Directive 2003/9, 2003 O.J. (L31) 18 (EC);
Directive 2013/33, 2013 O.J. (L180) 96 (EU)).
238
Id. para. 101.
239
Id. para. 101–5.
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compelled, it is shorter.240 The President concluded: “To the best of
my knowledge, no western country maintains residency centers that
are not voluntary for asylum seekers . . . with the purpose of
population dispersal.”241 This led the Court to shorten the
maximum duration period allowed at the center from 20 months to
one year.
While the majority opinion acknowledged the differences
between the Israeli residence center and comparative practice, it did
not give enough weight to two additional factors. The first is that
many of the residency centers in other countries are dispersed
throughout the country, including in the major cities, rather than
located in an isolated desert, as in Israel.242 The Court equated
dispersal with placing undocumented entrants in an isolated
residence center.243 Only the concurring Justices emphasized this
240
See id. para. 101 (“Thus, for example, while asylum seekers in Germany and
Switzerland are required to stay in a reception center upon arrival in the country,
the period of that stay is only three months.”).
241
Id. para. 105.
242
See, e.g., Swiss Refugee Council, Types of Accommodation: Switzerland,
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/switzerland/receptionconditions/housing
/types-accommodation
[https://perma.cc/S27X-M7DJ]
(highlighting the use of underground bunkers to raise reception capacity);
Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration, Types of Accommodation: Germany,
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/receptionconditions/housing/types-accommodation [https://perma.cc/959F-5BSY] (“For a
period of up to 6 months after their application has been filed, asylum seekers are
generally obliged to stay in an initial reception centre (Aufnahmeeinrichtung). An
obligation to stay in these centres for a maximum of 24 months may be imposed by
Federal States as of July 2017 although only Bavaria had made use of this provision
until the end of 2017. Furthermore, asylum seekers from Safe Countries of Origin
are obliged to stay there for the whole duration of their procedures . . . there is at
least one such centre in each of Germany’s 16 Federal States with most Federal
States having several initial reception facilities.”); ASGI, Types of Accommodation:
Italy,
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy/receptionconditions/housing/types-accommodation [https://perma.cc/3FF2-S6GY] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2019); Accem, Types of Accommodation: Spain,
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/spain/types-accommodation
[https://perma.cc/G6H7-XLSK] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019); Dutch Council for
Refugees,
Types
of
Accommodation:
Netherlands,
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/netherlands/receptionconditions/access-forms-reception-conditions/types
[https://perma.cc/3Y29J8K3] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
243
President Naor brought support for the residency center from UNHCR.
“Even the U.N. Commission for Refugees—in its comments upon the bill for the
Law that is the subject of these proceedings—recognized that dispersal of the
asylum-seeking population among various cities is necessary in order to ease the
burden upon the cities in which the infiltrators have concentrated.” File No.
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difference. Justice Amit wrote: “The Israeli model is unique, and in
practice, it is not intended for population dispersion, as argued, but
rather to concentrate the population in one facility that is remote
from any settled area.”244 Justice Melcer similarly suggested that a
previously attempted dispersion plan “would be preferable from
the perspective of the Petitioners to that of a remote residency center
surrounded only by sand and desert.”245
The second is that while in other countries the residency centers
typically hold recent arrivals,246 Israel prioritized those who have
been in the country the longest to move to the residency center
first.247 This difference should affect the test of balancing rights
versus social interests: The infringement of the constitutional rights
of the undocumented entrant is of a much smaller scope when the
person has just recently entered the country and the state places him
or her in a certain region, and much greater when the state uproots
a person from a place of residence and integration of a few years.
4.4. Comparing the Incomparable: 3. Third Country Agreements
The Court used extensive comparative law to also legitimize its
decision to uphold Israel’s confidential third country agreements.
Under these agreements, Israel may remove undocumented
entrants from Eritrea and Sudan to two countries, which will allow
these migrants to reside and work.248 Under these agreements, Israel
8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset, para. 69 (Aug. 11,
2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
244
File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset,
para. 5 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Amit., J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription,
in Hebrew) (Isr.).
245
Id. at para. 9 (Melcer, J., Opinion). For an elaborate plan to “disperse”
asylum seekers in different parts of Israel, see Amir Alon, Business tycoons present
(May
23,
2018),
asylum
seeker
integration
plan,
YNETNEWS
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5268553,00.html
[https://perma.cc/K5QK-QP9H].
246 See supra note 240.
247 See supra Part 2.
248 See File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem) Zegete v.
Minister of the Interior (Aug. 28, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.). According to the press, the two countries are Rwanda and Uganda,
despite the two countries’ denials; see, e.g., Lee Yaron & Noa Landau, Israel Releases
Asylum Seekers Jailed for Refusing Deportation to Rwanda, HAARETZ (April 4, 2018,
10:57 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/uganda-no-deal-with-israelfor-them-to-dump-their-refugees-here-1.5976136 [https://perma.cc/FR75-LSP7].
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committed not to disclose the identity of these countries and to
transfer undocumented entrants to these third countries only with
their consent.249 Israel offered those consenting to removal, a
monetary award of $3,500 USD,250 and announced that those who
refuse the removal would be detained, until this policy was
prohibited by the Court.251 Israel further committed to the Court
that “at this stage” it will remove only undocumented entrants who
did not apply for asylum or whose application it rejected.252 It
further committed to remove those arriving last first, though most
candidates for removal spent at least a few years in Israel.253
The removal scheme evolved over time and resulted in several
petitions and an appeal to the Israeli High Court of Justice, until the
State effectively nullified it when the third countries backed out of
the agreement. As a result, the Court decided only the first
challenge regarding the third country agreements and rendered the
rest of the petitions redundant with the nullification of the
agreement.254
The Court held that there is “almost universal consensus” that a
state has the authority under international law to remove
undocumented entrants to safe third countries based on an

This is also supported by the testimonies of those who the State removed to the
third countries. See Ruvi Ziegler, Benjamin Netanyahu’s U-turn: no redemption for
asylum seekers in Israel, THE CONVERSATION (April 9, 2018, 8:43 AM),
http://theconversation.com/benjamin-netanyahus-u-turn-no-redemption-forasylum-seekers-in-israel-94441 [https://perma.cc/V2A3-9QDH].
249
See File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem), Zegete v.
Minister of the Interior, para. 3, 33, 117 (Aug. 28, 2017) (Naor, Pres., Opinion), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
250
See id. para. 6.
251
See id. para. 5.
252
Id. para. 5. The later deportation procedure from January 2018 did,
however, specifically mention that PIA “will consider expanding the population”
which might be removed to a third country, including persons whose asylum
applications are pending. See Third Country Removals Procedures, art. 3.4 (Jan. 30,
2018),
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/policy/third_country_deportation_procedure/
he/10.9.0005_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y9M-Q6PT].
253
Id. para. 16.
254
See File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem), Zegete v.
Minister of the Interior (Aug. 28, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.). One of the petitions required primary legislation to execute removal
of undocumented migrants under the non-delegation doctrine. File No. 679/18
High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Avivi v. Prime Minister (Apr. 10, 2018) Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

102

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:1

individual decision.255 The court stated, “There is no rule of
international law that prohibits the transfer of asylum seekers to a
third country.”256 Under international law, states may share the
responsibility of processing applications for refuge and granting
refugee status. On the comparative level, third country agreements
are widespread throughout the Western world, including Europe,
Australia, the U.S., and Canada.257 In fact, “In the last decades, states
have signed hundreds of third country agreements, most of them
bilateral and a few multilateral, many of them by members of the
European Union.”258 Neither international law nor internal law
requires the State to obtain the consent of the undocumented entrant
as a condition for his or her removal.259 The Court found that the
confidentiality of the particular third country agreements was a
hindrance to proper supervision of their execution. However,
although it is extremely uncommon in third country agreements, the
State successfully convinced the Court that it is able to supervise the
execution of these agreements.260 The Court further held that the
petitioners did not meet the burden of convincing it that these third
countries were unsafe in light of the State’s data.261 Finally, the
Court held that the State was not authorized to detain people in
order to compel them to agree to their removal, since the particular
third country agreements required that removal only be done with
consent of the undocumented entrant. Nonetheless, the State may
detain a person for 60 days, as provided in the Entry to Israel Law,
to enable his or her removal to a different country, but only if such
an option of removal was at all feasible.262
The Court conducted a massive investigation into international
and comparative law to determine whether the practice of third
country agreements is widespread. Indeed, many countries have
signed and implemented third country agreements.263 Yet the Court
Id. paras. 30–32, 38.
Id. para. 39.
257
See id. para. 37.
258
Id. para. 77.
259
See id. paras. 33–34, 115–17.
260
See id. paras. 79–103.
261
See id. paras. 56, 74. The Court held that these countries were parties to the
Refugee Convention, had UNHCR offices, and allowed the undocumented
migrants access to their court system. Id. paras. 86, 101.
262
See id. para. 124.
263
See, e.g., GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 156, at 390–408; HATHAWAY,
supra note 100, at 659–95; Cathryn Costello, The Asylum Procedures Directive and the
255
256
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failed to acknowledge or give proper weight to the major differences
between the international practice of third country agreements and
the agreement discussed in Zegete. First, most third country
agreements are intended to enable a state to shift the responsibility
of conducting RSD to another country and apply to recent arrivals.
The State cannot “relieve” itself of the responsibility, once the person
becomes “lawfully present,” as was arguably done in the Israeli
agreements.264
Second, typically third countries have some kind of nexus with
the undocumented entrant, whether it is his or her country of
citizenship, residence, habitual residence, or even a country of
transit.265 Thus, under the Directive of the European Union, the
concept of a safe third country requires “a connection between the
applicant and the third country concerned on the basis of which it
would be reasonable for that person to go to that country.”266 This
nexus is the reason for the expectation that the third country should
share the responsibility for the immigrant, and it makes the transfer
of the immigrant to the third country more reasonable, since there is
a connection between the immigrant and that state. It is also
arguably fairer since it prevents “asylum shopping” on the
immigrant’s part.
In contrast to the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court to uphold
these agreements, some courts around the world have struck down

Proliferation of Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of
International Protection?, 7 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 35 (2005).
264 See supra Part 2.3.2.
265
This has not, however, been Australia’s policy. See Shani Bar-Tuvia,
Australian and Israeli Agreements for the Permanent Transfer of Refugees: Stretching
Further the (Il)legality and (Im)morality of Western Externalization Policies, 30 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 474–76, 486–88 (2018) (discussing Australia and Israel’s new policy
against refugees regarding permanent transfer to countries in exchange for
payment to the countries).
266
Directive 2013/32/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 June 2013 on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International
Protection,
2013
O.J.
(L
180),
80,
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/Dve-2013-32-AsylumProcedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/894A-XM8S].
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third country agreements,267 or prevented their implementation268 in
circumstances that would jeopardize the human rights of
undocumented entrants. Thus, despite taking a rather activist
stance on some other immigration-related matters, the Israeli Court
is lagging behind other courts who have taken a more activist
approach on similar matters.
Overall, this Part has shown that the use of comparative law and
practice in the treatment of refugees must account for the differences
as well as the similarities between different legal regimes to qualify
as a legitimating factor of judicial decisions. When differences are
not addressed, it might reflect the failure of the courts to bring the
political branches to accountability on the domestic as well as
international levels.
5. THE ROAD AHEAD
Constitutional courts are often the players that protect the rights
of asylum seekers and require the representative branches to abide
by their international and constitutional obligations. This dynamic
is unfolding in the U.S., especially since the election of President
Trump. It has been part of Israeli politics and law since 2007. These
two countries have been influencing each other’s policies with
regard to immigration and treatment of refugees. It is thus
worthwhile to study the human and legal drama accompanying
Israel’s treatment of undocumented entrants. It may serve as an
important lesson for the U.S.
Presumably, the Israeli Supreme Court has attempted to walk a
fine line between protecting the rights of undocumented entrants in
267
See, e.g., Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (holding
that Italy could not evade its responsibilities under the European Convention of
Human Rights by relying on a bilateral agreement with Libya, and that intercepting
ships at sea and preventing their arrival to Italy by returning asylum seekers to
Libya may be a violation of the non-refoulement principle); Plaintiff M70/2011 v.
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for
Immigration & Citizenship [2011] HCA 1, 32 (Austl.) (invalidating the Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship’s declaration of Malaysia as a country that Australia
may remove asylum seekers to in order for Malaysia to process their asylum claims,
partly because Malaysia was not a party to the Refugee Convention).
268
See, e.g., M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09 Eur. Ct. H.R (2011)
(finding by the European Court of Human Rights that Belgium was in violation of
its international obligations for transferring an asylum seeker to Greece under the
Dublin II Regulation, even though Belgium should have known of the deficiencies
of Greece’s asylum procedures).
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strategically planned decisions, on the one hand, and preserving its
own institutional legitimacy, on the other hand. The Court made an
effort to downplay its own activism and reduce the tension with the
other branches of government by engaging in constitutional
avoidance, sectioning laws to suggest that it had struck down fewer
laws than it actually had, and delaying decisions to enable parties to
strike a compromise. It strategically used comparative law to
anticipate and address critiques from all parts of Israeli society,
when often the comparison did not adequately address the
differences between legal systems. This was most evident by the
Israeli judicial reliance on Zadvydas.269
The Court may have tried not to displease the different parties
too much on this sensitive, ideological, conflict. It strategically
refrained from requiring the representative branches to make
efficient individual RSD determinations as part of a binding
constitutional decision.
It further refrained from inferring
constitutional implications from the length of presence of
undocumented entrants in Israel. With these two moves, it tried to
please the critics of the Court from the “right” by appearing as if it
was deferring to the State on these matters, despite the fact that the
State was determined to drag its feet on these issues. It, nonetheless,
courageously protected “core” constitutional rights of these
undocumented entrants, thus responding to demands of its critics
from the “left.”
Leaving undocumented entrants in civil and political limbo
carries a heavy cost. It negatively impacts their ability to enjoy
human rights and undermines society’s character, cohesiveness, and
values more generally. As the Trump administration is attempting
to confer undocumented entrants from the Mexican border similar
indeterminate status, the Israeli Court’s experience with judicial
restraint should serve as a cautionary tale for the federal courts that
will determine whether Trump’s asylum ban is upheld.
The Israeli Court employed these avoidance methods based on
strategic considerations.
However, they led to costs, both
domestically and internationally, that outweighed the benefits to the
Court, the representative bodies, and Israeli society. The Court itself
ultimately authorized putting undocumented entrants in a confined
residency center based on their group characteristics rather than
individual acts.

269

See supra Part 4.2.
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The Court now enjoys little trust from all sides of the
controversy, and political attempts to diminish its power—whether
in general or in immigration matters—persist. There are various
legislative bills that attempt to constrain the Court’s judicial review
power and grant the legislature a general override power that will
overcome constitutional decisions.270 Israel still weighs different
options to remove undocumented entrants to third countries or
countries of origin, especially since Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a
peace agreement ending a 20-year war.271 This state of affairs led
Holocaust survivors and others in Israel to argue that Israel is
shamefully mistreating refugees. The Israeli society is torn over the
issue of the desirable treatment of these undocumented entrants and
how to understand their status, and it was the Court’s duty to
demand that the representative bodies decide the merits of these
important questions.
Last but not least, while the political branches may have thought
they could persuade the international community that these are
economic migrants, the world views Israel with disdain for
attempting to remove people that other countries treat as refugees.272
This debate, in which different elements of Israeli society talk past
each other, could have been conducted more constructively, if only
this responsible adult—the Court—had required the representative
bodies to decide who these people were. By deciding this question,
Israel would have also decided who it was.
270
See, e.g., Jonathan Lis & Revital Hovel, Right-Wing Ministers Unveil Bill to
Let Knesset Override Supreme Court, HAARETZ (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:28 PM),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-bill-would-let-knessetoverride-supreme-court-1.5629190 [https://perma.cc/4MD6-2DS3] (discussing the
unlikelihood of the proposed Basic Law—a law that would allow the Knesset to
reenact past overturned laws by the Supreme Court—to pass considering both sides
of the coalition are currently withholding support); Stuart Winer & TOI Staff, In UTurn, Netanyahu Said to Reject ‘Extreme’ Draft of High Court Override Bill, TIMES ISR.
(Apr. 15, 2018, 12:42 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-u-turn-netanyahusaid-to-reject-extreme-draft-of-high-court-override-bill/
[https://perma.cc/2HUQ-DA8M] (discussing the divide over limiting the power
of the judicial branch).
271
See Lee Yaron, Israel Considers Deporting Asylum Seekers to Eritrea and Sudan,
HAARETZ (July 24, 2018, 6:54 AM), https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/.premium-israel-mulls-deporting-asylum-seekers-back-to-eritrea-andsudan-1.6310950 [https://perma.cc/FR75-LSP7].
272
See Gershom Gorenberg, Israel is Betraying its History by Expelling African
Asylum-Seekers,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
29,
2018,
2:05
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/globalopinions/wp/2018/01/29/israel-is-betraying-its-history-by-expelling-africanasylum-seekers/?utm_term=.9b5f5546fcc2 [https://perma.cc/K3B5-ZEF7].
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